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China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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22 APRIL 1987

CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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SOVIET UNION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BEIJING PAPER REPORTS SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION AGENCY

Beijing WEN ZHAI BAO in Chinese No 362, 6 Nov 86 p 1

[Article extracted from GUOJI WENTI ZILIAO [INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS MATERIALS],
No 19: "The Soviet Army's Strategic Deception Agency"]

[Text] There is a pivotal, extremely powerful special agency in the Soviet armed forces--the Strategic Deception General Department [zhanlue qipian zongju 2069 3970 2952 7499 4920 1444]--whose existence was unknown to the intelligence agencies of the world before a lieutenant from Soviet military intelligence defected to the West. Established in 1968, the Bureau is nominally subordinate to the Headquarters of the General Staff. It consists of seven departments--one of which, Department No 7, has responsibility for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks--and a central command. The latter takes charge of tracking all intelligence-gathering satellites and space stations and issuing long- and short-range forecasts concerning what times satellites pass over Soviet territory or territorial waters. Such data form the basis of military orders to subordinate units to turn off all radio transmitters and radar at appropriate times. At the same time, radio transmitters and radar charged with deception go into action by sending out misleading transmissions to enemy satellites. Western intelligence analysts estimate that the Soviet Union spends as much as \$4 billion annually on the manufacture of disinformation by the General Bureau, the KGB, and other agencies.

In addition to the above-mentioned tasks, the bureau has several other major responsibilities: camouflaging important targets and putting up bogus targets to foil enemy reconnaissance, studying news reports and then issuing false information to foreign news organizations, enforcing secrecy in the Soviet military and armaments industries to safeguard national secrets, fabricating and disseminating phony intelligence to trick the enemy into making mistaken assessments and wrong moves, and coordinating the activities of various branches of the Soviet armed forces to create favorable conditions for surprise attacks in times of war.

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

'DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM' OF BOURGEOIS LIBERALIZATION REFUTED

HK130625 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Zhu Junfeng (2612 1498 1496): "What Kind of Democratic Concept Should Be Established?"]

[Text] Democracy is a state system and a basic right of citizens prescribed by the Constitution. Correct exercise of this right is based on the establishment and enhancement of the citizens' democratic idea and their sense of democracy. In the actual political life of our country, some comrades lack a correct idea about democracy and do not know how correctly to exercise their democratic right. A small number of people with ulterior motives even try to abuse this right in order to spread remarks against the four cardinal principles and advocate bourgeois liberalization. Therefore, to strengthen education in democracy and the legal system, helping people establish a correct idea about democracy and draw a clear demarcation line between democracy and bourgeois liberalization, is an important task at present on the ideological front which we must not neglect.

Our country is now still in the elementary stage of socialism, and there is still a gap between our current degree of democracy and that of democracy in the higher stage of socialism. As Marx said, "Rights can never exceed the limits allowed by the socioeconomic structure and the social cultural development as restricted by the economic structure." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels" Vol 3, p 12) Without seeing this point, we may think that the democratic system in our country is already perfect and sound in all aspects and the degree of democracy is high enough, so there is no need to continue to advance the democratic process. This is obviously wrong. However, we should also notice that in our country, the exploiting class has been overthrown and eliminated and a socialist democratic system under which the people are masters of the state has been established. As Lenin said, it is the "highest type of democracy" in human history, and it has unparalleled superiority compared with the bourgeois democratic system, which only serves the monopoly capitalist class. "Degree of the development of democracy" and "type of democracy" are two different concepts. The former refers to the development level of democracy in various stages of socialism; the latter refers to the essential difference between two different democratic systems.

The concrete form of capitalist democracy is "perfect," but its essence is of a system only serving the bourgeoisie. Although some concrete points of our current democratic system are still not perfect and satisfactory, we cannot think that our system is not as good as bourgeois democracy--still less should we completely copy the democratic system of the capitalist countries. Our correct attitude should be to advance continuously our socioeconomic and cultural development in light of our national conditions under the premise of adhering to socialism and create conditions for gradually raising the development level of our country's socialist democracy.

Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang, and a very small number of people who advocate bourgeois liberalization openly called on people to "struggle for democracy" from the party and the government. They completely mixed up the entities of democracy under the two different social systems. Under the capitalist system, state power is held in the hands of the monopoly capitalist class, and the democratic system only serves the purpose of safeguarding the capitalist exploiting system. So, the entity that can enjoy democracy can only be the ruling class in such a society--the bourgeoisie. The proletariat and all other working people are exploited and oppressed and completely deprived of democratic rights. Under such social conditions, the proletariat should certainly carry out the struggle to "win democracy" from the bourgeoisie until finally seizing state power and establishing the proletarian democratic system. Under the socialist conditions, the proletariat and the working masses hold state power and act as masters of the state. They are certainly the entity of socialist democracy. In these circumstances, if someone raises the slogan of "struggling for democracy," he would just "struggle for democracy" from himself. So, this is something unreasonable. How could the people "struggle for democracy" from the CPC, which has led the people in winning their democratic rights through bloody struggles and is now leading the people in building a high degree of democracy? The people's master position is completely in keeping with the party's leadership. Only with the party's leadership can the people's master position be guaranteed and realized. Of course, in our actual political life, there are still some serious bureaucratist phenomena, and some defects and shortcomings still exist in some local democratic channels. However, since the people have become the entity of socialist democracy, these defects and shortcomings can only be overcome under party leadership through the joint efforts of all cadres and the masses, and only thus can the socialist democratic system be improved step by step. The drastic means of antagonism between the people, party, and the government, and the method of "winning democracy" from the reactionary government in the past must not be used. Such extremes will just cause new chaos and retard the process of socialist democracy rather than promote the improvement of the socialist democratic system.

We should also understand that democracy under no circumstances means that "one can do or say whatever one wants." As any other right, democracy is closely linked with people's duties and is conditioned and proscribed by law and discipline, so democracy is never unlimited. Marx said: "There is no right that is not accompanied with duty, and no duty that is not accompanied with right." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," vol. 2, p 137) He also pointed out: "Freedom is a right to engage in any activities that will do not harm to other people. The limits of such activities are defined by law."

("The Complete Works of Marx and Engels" Vol 1, p 438) China's Constitution stipulates that citizens have the right of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration. At the same time, it also clearly stipulates: "The exercise by citizens of the PRC of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society, and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens." This reflects the unity between rights and duties and between democracy and the legal system. For example, when you enjoy freedom of speech and of the press, you must at the same time bear responsibility for not opposing the four cardinal principles and not slandering and defaming other people; when you enjoy the right to work, you must also abide by work discipline; when you exercise your right to carry out assembly and demonstration, we must at the same time observe relevant regulations and must not disturb public order and obstruct traffic. Otherwise, you will be punished according to party discipline or administrative discipline. This is not only to keep the democratic right within some bounds, but is also a guarantee of the rights. If democracy is not conditioned and confined by law, and if every individual can do whatever he likes without any restriction, the lawful rights of the state, of society, and of individual citizens would be infringed upon at will by other people and the entire society would turn into complete chaos. How then could there be any democracy and freedom? Shouldn't we bear in mind the lesson given by the 10-years of turmoil?

In 1980, Comrade Deng Xiaoping clearly pointed out: "Socialist democracy and the socialist legal system are inseparable. Democracy without the socialist legal system, without the party's leadership, and without discipline and order is not socialist democracy." ("Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping" p 319) At present, a very small number of people who advocate bourgeois liberalization, such as Fang Lizhi and Wang Ruowang, flaunted the banner of "democracy and freedom" to spread remarks negating the party's leadership and opposing the socialist system. This is by no means democracy. This is negation of the four cardinal principles stipulated by the Constitution and advocates the capitalist system. All of us who have a sense of social responsibility should take a clear-cut attitude to oppose this trend of bourgeois liberalization. The PLA is an armed organization with a high degree of unity under the party's leadership. We have a glorious democratic tradition, and also have the tradition of observing strict discipline. All of our cadres and soldiers should carry forward these fine traditions, establish a correct idea about democracy, understand the unity between democracy and the legal system, and set a good example in observing the Constitution, the law, and discipline. Only thus can we really join hands with the people throughout the country in advancing the process of socialist democracy and the building of the socialist legal system.

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

EARLY STAGES OF SOCIALISM STILL HAVE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC FLAWS

HK180953 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Meng Fansen [1322 4907 2773]: "Have a Correct Understanding of the Development Stage of China's Socialism"]

[Text] A correct understanding of the development stage of socialism, which has profound theoretical and practical significance, is the premise and starting point for guiding socialist construction. The decision adopted by the 6th Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee made a significant theoretical contribution, that is, it confirmed that "China is still in the initial stage of socialism." This understanding was not easily acquired.

Following the resolution adopted by the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC Central Committee, the "Outline for Studying and Publicizing the Party's General Line During the Transitional Period," printed and distributed by the Propaganda Department in 1953 with the approval of the CPC Central Committee, pointed out for the first time since the founding of the PRC that the transitional period following the founding of new China was "the historical period covering the transition from the new democratic society to a socialist society." China's first constitution, established in 1954, again affirmed that China's social system was a "new democratic system." In 1956, the Eighth CPC Congress declared that "the socialist system has already been established in China." At the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee, held in May 1956, Comrade Mao Zedong used the concept "prior to the establishment of a socialist society," which indicated his view that a socialist society had not yet been established. However, he presided over the Beidaihe conference in August the same year and pointed out in the resolution on establishing the people's communes that "we should build socialism at an earlier date and gradually effect the transition toward communism." He also said that "the realization of communism in China is not a distant and remote matter. We should try to discover a path leading toward communism." This erroneous estimation immediately led to grave consequences. The Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee, held from November to December that year, corrected the mistake in the Resolution on Several Questions Concerning the People's Communes, affirmed that China was still in the development stage of socialism, and criticized the fantasy of "immediate transition to communism" which transcended stages. Later, the idea that socialist society covers a historical period of considerable length was

basically established. However, the pessimistic view that China's socialism was "more or less like capitalism" prevailed in 1975 due to the failure of the "Great Cultural Revolution." Nevertheless, the 1978 revised constitution declared: "China has become a socialist country with the beginnings of prosperity." In a word, our party's understanding of the development stage of China's socialism was correct by and large prior to the Eighth CPC Congress. Later, its understanding inclined to the "left" and occasionally to the right.

Following the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, we summed up both historical experience and lessons, discarded the "two whatevers," eliminated the influence of the "leftist" deviation, proceeded from practice and China's actual circumstances, and corrected and deepened our understanding of the development stage of China's socialism. The "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC" adopted by the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1981 pointed out: "Although our socialist system is still in its early phase of development, China has undoubtedly established a socialist system and entered the stage of socialist society. Any view denying this basic fact is wrong." In 1982, the political report to the 12th CPC Congress said: "As our socialist society is still in its initial stage, it is not yet highly developed materially. However, the establishment of the socialist system makes it possible for us to build a high level of socialist spiritual civilization while striving for material civilization, just as the development of a modern economy to a certain level and the appearance of the most advanced class of our time, the working class, and its vanguard, the Communist Party, made it possible to succeed in socialist revolution."

While discussing the issue that cultivation of ethics among the people should match the historical development of the economic base, the resolution adopted by the 6th Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee pointed out: "Since our country is still in the initial stage of socialism, we must apply the principle of distribution according to work and develop socialist commodity economy and competition. Also, for a long time to come, we shall develop varied sectors of the economy, always ensuring the dominant position of the public sector, and we shall encourage some of the people to become prosperous first, before the objective of common prosperity is achieved." We can realize from a comparison of the three above-mentioned related formulations that the first one was aimed at the trend in society which denied that China had already entered the socialist society. It stressed that China had already established a socialist system. The second one was aimed at the view which did not believe that China could also build a high level of spiritual civilization. It stressed the building of a high level of socialist spiritual civilization while striving for material civilization. Although the resolution of the 6th Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee referred to the cultivation of ethics, it pointed out explicitly that varied sectors of the economy should be developed, with the public sector occupying a dominant position, and that the purpose of encouraging some people to become prosperous first is to attain the objective of common prosperity. This reveals the essential characteristics of the initial stage of socialism and deepens theoretically understanding of the development stage of China's socialism.

The deepening of this understanding has great guiding significance. Since China is still in the initial stage of socialism and our productive forces are still underdeveloped, our work should be focused on economic construction, and the improvement of our living standard should not go beyond the development of production. It indicates that there are yet many defects in our economic and political systems. Instead of acting with undue haste, we should fully understand the complex nature and arduousness of the reform. It also shows that the influence of the decadent feudal and capitalist ideas is not yet eliminated and that we should combat bourgeois liberalization with a clear-cut stand. Only by acquiring an understanding in this way can we avoid twists and turns and build socialism with Chinese characteristics.

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

HU QILI URGES YOUTH TO EMULATE PLA SACRIFICE

OW251529 Beijing XINHUA in English 1435 GMT 25 Jan 87

[Text] Beijing, January 25 (XINHUA)--A Communist Party leader today called on the people, young people in particular, to learn from the spirit of self-sacrifice displayed by commanders and soldiers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Hu Qili, member of the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee, made the call while receiving a delegation of model workers who had just returned from the Laoshan area bordering Vietnam.

Hu urged the entire Chinese people, particularly the young people, to emulate the spirit embodied in the slogan "Ready to sacrifice myself for the happiness of the one billion" raised by the frontier guards in the Laoshan area.

It is under this slogan that many soldiers have willingly given their lives in battles for China's self-defence, Hu noted.

He also urged delegation members not only to tell their fellow workers what they had seen in their visit, but also spread the experience of the Army in doing political and ideological work to imbue soldiers with this revolutionary spirit.

Political and ideological work should become the "lifeline" of all work. "Only in this way will it be possible for China's modernization endeavor to have a powerful motive force and the fight against bourgeois liberalization to have a power weapon," he said.

Two other party leaders, Deng Liqun and Hao Jianxiu, were also present on the occasion.

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

ARMY PAPER REFUTES WANG RUOWANG'S VIEWS ON CHINESE SOCIALISM

HK231540 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 12 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Li Huixin (2621 2037 0207) and Zhao Yuehua (6392 6460 5478):
"Building Socialism in China Is a Historical Necessity"]

[Text] Is it a historical necessity that China should take the socialist road? Is it "too early" to establish the socialist system in China, which is economically underdeveloped? We should say that the practice of socialist revolution and construction in China has already given an affirmative answer to these questions long ago. However, in order to peddle their rubbish of bourgeois liberalization, Wang Ruowang and others have provoked a new debate over these questions, confusing the ideas of some people, especially some young people who know little about the Marxist theories. Therefore, it is necessary for us to make further theoretical expositions on the historical necessity for China to take the socialist road, which is a fundamental question.

Does Building Socialism in China Run Counter to the Law Governing the Development of Society?

When advocating that it is too early to practice socialism in China, Wang Ruowang said: "Society is developed in the order of slave society--feudal society--capitalist society." Since China has "jumped over" the historical stage of capitalism, it means "an open violation of Marxism." This is a viewpoint that has been disguised as "Marx's analysis of the stages of social development" and has greatly confused people.

True enough, Marxism holds that there is a law governing the development of human society, that is, society is developed in the order of primitive society, slave society, feudal society, capitalist society, and then communist society. This is a general historical course of the development of human society. Judging from human society as a whole, the order and trend of the replacement of these economic systems in the above-mentioned order cannot be changed or surpassed. But this does not mean that in a certain nation, region, or state, none of the five economic systems can be reduced, just like writing the rigid eight-part essay. In world history, it is not rare for the development of some backward nations to have "surpassed certain stages." In ancient China, there were quite a few examples showing that some nationalities,

which had not yet fully developed the slave system, "jumped" to the feudalist stage after invading China. In Europe, after the disintegration of the primitive communes, the Germanic peoples went directly into the feudalist serf society, "jumping" over the slave society stage. This is also a historical fact known to all. Does all this mean that the law governing the development of human society, which was brought to light by Marx, is untenable? Of course not. What this law describes is the main line of evolution of the entire human society, disregarding the special phenomena resulting from various factors such as the imbalance in the development of different nations, states, and regions. If we analyze the concrete problems with the development of the entire human society in a certain historical period as a general background, we can find that the so-called contradictions between the "jumping" development of certain nations, states, or regions in a certain period and the general law governing the development of society discovered by Marx do not exist at all. Let us look at the above two examples. If the feudalist economic formation was not relatively fully developed in the central plains of China, if the slave system of the Roman Empire did not carry within itself the factor of the feudalist serf system, there could not have been the so-called "jumping" development of some backward nationalities of ancient China and the ancient Germanic peoples in their social development. In fact, although the development of certain nations, states, or regions can sometimes surpass certain historical stages, the progress of the human society as a whole will not go beyond the track revealed by Marx. The general progress or general law of the development of the human society is also determined by the concrete developments of various nations, states, and regions, which differ in thousands of ways and which have their own distinctive characteristics (including the "jumping" developments of certain nations, states, and regions). Lenin also said: "While the development of world history as a whole follows general laws, it is by no means precluded but, on the contrary, is to be presumed, that certain periods of development may display peculiarities either in form or in order of development." ("Selected Works of Lenin, Vol 4, p 690)

It is even more wrong to hold that establishing the socialist economic system in China is surpassing the capitalist stage and running counter to the law governing social development discovered by Marx. What we should point out first is that it is inadequate to say that China has surpassed the capitalist stage. As early as the middle stage of the Ming Dynasty, the seeds of capitalism had already appeared in China. After the Opium Wars, China's national capitalism began to develop. In the period before liberation, capitalist industry made up about 10 percent of the national economy. It is thus obvious that in the past more than 100 years, China's capitalism had developed to a certain extent and through various channels. It is right to say that China has not experienced a stage of full development of capitalism like Europe and the United States, but it is unrealistic to say that China has completely surpassed the capitalist stage. At the same time, we must also recognize that after the Opium Wars, as a result of the invasion by Western capitalism, the normal historical progress of Chinese society itself was interrupted. China, which was still shackled by the feudalist system, then became an object to be trampled on by the developed Western capitalist countries and was gradually reduced to the status of a colony of the imperialist

powers. After being reduced to the status of a colony, it became a raw material production area of the developed capitalist countries, and an area for them to dump their surplus products, export their surplus capital, and exploit cheap labor. This also indicated that China was compelled to join the world capitalist system. In the epoch of imperialism, the colonial countries, though in that stage of development which is comparatively backward compared with other countries, judging from the general situation of the economic and political progress of the whole world, have become an indispensable part of the world's capitalist system. The struggle of the people of the colonial countries for independence and liberation is also a struggle to extricate themselves from the oppression and exploitation of international capital. The development of this struggle, which is an opposite of the world's capitalist system, inevitably leads to socialism. Under the special internal and external conditions after World War II, the CPC led the broad masses of people to break through the weak link of the rule of international monopoly capital and establish the socialist system in our country. All this appeared in direct opposition to the world's capitalist system. It was by no means an output of the "subjective illusion" of a few "leaders," as was declared by Wang Ruowang. Just think, without the worldwide expansion of Western capitalism on the basis of its relatively quick development, without being brought into the world's capitalist, or imperialist, ruling system, without the extensive development of the international workers' movement, which was an output of the inherent contradictions of capitalism, and the emergence and spreading of Marxism-Leninism, a scientific and theoretical reflection of the international workers' movement, how could China possibly enter the period of socialism before capitalism was fully developed there? In other words, the "dumping" development of our country had an objective condition of the full development of international capitalism. It was an inevitable result of the development of capitalism to its highest stage, the imperialist stage. It is thus obvious that if we do not restrict our vision within the frame of China's backwardness but take the development of the entire capitalist world as the background while pondering questions, we can find that we have full reason to believe that the establishment of the socialist system in our country is an expression of the inevitable trend of historical development discovered by Marx, which is characterized by the inevitable replacement of capitalism by socialism.

Could China Possibly Develop Capitalism First?

According to Wang Ruowang's vulgar understanding of the law governing social development, a logical conclusion should be: China should give up socialism and should develop capitalism first. Wang Ruowang held that at present, the capitalist mode of production "is rightly what China needs" and "urgently needs."

Being historical materialists, we recognize the position and role of capitalism in historical development. It might not be a bad thing for the Chinese people if capitalism had fully developed in our country and the productive forces had thus been greatly promoted. However, history cannot be rewritten. When the Western bourgeoisie was developing vigorously and establishing the capitalist system, the highly mature feudal society in China, which was also

firm and stable due to its specific structure, affected the seed of capitalism so that it was only able to develop with great difficulty under high pressure and was unable to grow into a tall tree. Moreover, after various imperialist powers invaded China, the collusion of imperialism and feudalism completely blocked the road of independent development of China's capitalism. From the Reform Movement of 1898 to the 1911 Revolution, many people, represented by pioneers such as Hong Rengan, who wrote "A New Book on Government Administration," and Kang Youwei, who wrote "The Book of Great Harmony," tried to develop capitalism in China. They carried out one struggle after another, but all failed in the end. The modern history of China tells us that it is not that the Chinese people did not want to take the road of independent development of capitalism, nor that the Chinese people did not fight for it, but that the objective historical conditions did not allow China to take this road. Comrade Mao Zedong said: "China cannot establish a bourgeois republic, which has been established in foreign countries, because it is a country oppressed by imperialism. The only path for it is to establish a people's republic under the leadership of the working class." Through painful explorations and paying high costs, the Chinese people finally found the path of building socialism via new democratism. However, even to this day, when socialism has been developing for more than 30 years, Wang Ruowang still wants to push China back to a blind alley which has been proved by history to be unsuitable for China. This certainly cannot be accepted by the great majority of the Chinese people.

What we need to point out here is that an important reason some people have been confused by Wang Ruowang's views on developing capitalism is the fact that China lacks the material prerequisite for the development of socialism. Thus, a question has been raised on how to correctly understand the material prerequisite for establishing the socialist economic system. When the world enters the epoch of imperialism, the transition of human society from capitalism to socialism is no longer a mere theoretical necessity, but also living practice. With the general background of capitalism having gained the dominant position in the world, so long as there is a necessary material prerequisite, not just those countries with a higher level of development, but also those with a lower level of development, can establish the socialist system under certain conditions. In quality, the necessary material prerequisite for establishing the socialist system is the socialized productive forces of capitalism; in quantity, it is the development of these productive forces, which should reach the level of being capable of controlling the lifeline of the national economy. With this prerequisite, the proletariat is able, after taking over state power and through confiscating and transforming the capitalist economy, to establish a socialist economy in which the public ownership occupies the dominant position in the national economy.

Judging from this criterion, does China have the necessary prerequisite for building socialism? As we all know, in old China capitalist industry already made up about 10 percent of the national economy. There was not only national capital in China, but also bureaucrat capital and state monopoly capital. On the eve of liberation, bureaucratic capital already made up 2/3 of China's

total industrial capital and 80 percent of the capital for modern production in the industrial, communications, and other fields. It controlled 33 percent of the coal output, 67 percent of generated electricity, 90 percent of steel output, and 100 percent of oil and nonferrous metals in China as well as railways and air transportation throughout the nation and 44 percent of ship tonnage. This highly centralized monopoly capital controlled the lifelines of the national economy. What it reflected was already socialized grand production. Lenin said: "State monopolistic capitalism is a complete material preparation for socialism, the threshold of socialism, a rung in the ladder of history between which and the rung called socialism there are no intermediate rungs." ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 3, p 164) Obviously, after taking over state power, the proletariat can immediately transform this part of the capitalist economy into socialist economy. Since this economic sector was able to control the lifelines of the national economy when it was in the hands of the bureaucrat-capitalist class, it could also control the entire national situation when it became a socialist economy. Therefore, after the Chinese proletariat took over state power, it began to firmly grasp both the political and economic leadership of the state and make use of this leadership to transform the national capitalist industry and commerce so as to establish a socialist economic system with public ownership in the dominant position. This was the intrinsic basis for China to take the socialist road.

Is It Right To Attribute Certain Current Negative Phenomena to the Practice of Socialism?

While negating the historical necessity of taking the socialist road in China, Wang Ruowang also unlimitedly exaggerated certain negative phenomena in our society and some problems that have unexpectedly emerged. He also linked them with the socialist system, saying that over the past decades, we have drawn "horrible pictures" on the "blank paper" of China, making it look as if socialism alone is to blame for all defects.

What are the problems existing in China? The most striking problem is our poor basis and lower productive forces. Is this a fault of practicing socialism? Of course, it is not. It is a consequence of the exploitation and oppression of feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism and the invasion and plunder of imperialism. In as little as 30 years after socialism was established in China, Chinese economy saw a relatively great development. In 1979, the industrial fixed assets of the whole country increased by 2,500 percent over 1949, the total industrial output value increased by 270 percent, and the national income increased by more than 700 percent. As to the achievements made since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, which was held in 1979, they are obvious for all to see. From this we can see that it is not because we began to practice socialism "too early" that China had a poor economic basis, but it is because of practicing socialism that China's backward situation was improved.

Some people may say that things cannot be thus explained by comparing with the pre-liberation days. All right then, let us compare our country with

another large country in Asia, which had similar historical conditions with our country but has been practicing capitalism since independence. From 1950 to 1979, the average annual growth rate of their industrial production was 5.9 percent, while that of their agricultural production was 2.5 percent. But in the same period, our industry increased at an average rate of 13 percent and our agriculture increased at a rate of 4.5 percent. Before declaring independence, their industrial level was a bit higher than that of our country, but since they adopted the capitalist system, after 30 years of development, our economic level became higher than theirs. In 1978, their per capita GNP was \$180, and ours was \$208, 15.6 percent higher than theirs. According to the calculation of their economists, 10 percent of the rich in their upper-class society were richer than the Chinese, but the rest were not as rich as the Chinese people. Although the capitalist mode of production has gained the dominant position in their country, feudal and semi-feudal relations still exist there, especially in the countryside. According to an investigation by their government, from 1971 to 1972, the land owners, who constituted 10 percent of the peasant population, owned 53 percent of the land, but 60 percent of the peasant population had only 9 percent of the land. All this formed a striking contrast with socialist China. How can we attribute the existing problems to practicing socialism in China "too early?"

Of course, there also exist some problems in our socialist construction over the past more than 30 years since the founding of the state. Since we mechanically copied a highly centralized and rigid economic pattern for a long time in the past to the neglect of China's real situation, and since we did not concentrate our efforts on the development of our economy due to the influence of the "leftist" ideology, the superiority of socialism was not brought into full play. This was not because we practiced socialism "too early," but because we lacked experience; it was not because the socialist economic system itself has problems, but because our economy system was not yet perfected; it was not because socialism does not have any superiority, but because it needs time to give full play to the superiority of socialism.

Judging from an angle of historical development, it is necessary to split the sentence that "China entered socialism without the full development of independent capitalism" into two parts. Being "without the full development of independent capitalism" was really a pity in the history of the Chinese nation. Under those conditions, China had more vestiges of the old society, such as the feudalist remnants and bureaucratism, and could not avoid being faced with more difficulties in promoting socialist democracy, establishing the socialist legal system, and perfecting the socialist administrative system. Clarifying this question is of great significance to gaining a better understanding of China's national situation and to building socialism with distinctive Chinese characteristics. As to the first part of the sentence, "China entered socialism," it is actually a good thing for the Chinese nation. The Chinese communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their leader, applied the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism in China under China's specific historical conditions and opened up a path for China to develop from new democratism to socialism. This was an immortal deed, enabling the

Chinese nation to stand firmly and independently among the world's nations. Owing to the establishment of the socialist system, China's historical development has been accelerated rather than postponed. In this sense, the fact that China has entered socialism without the full development of independent capitalism is not only a characteristic, but also a merit of the Chinese revolution. It is an application and development of scientific socialism under China's specific conditions.

In short, the taking of the socialist road by China, which is economically backward, is an outcome of China's special national situation under the historical prerequisite that the world has entered an epoch of imperialism and human society has begun to transit from capitalism to socialism. It is an historical necessity. Only socialism can save China and make China rich. This is a historical conclusion and a choice of the people. This historical trend is irresistible, just like the mighty Chang Jiang and the Huang He.

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

FANG LIZHI CRITICIZED, ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS QUESTIONED

HK040533 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 23 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Ma Guoqing (7456 0948 1987): "It Is Impermissible To Transform Our Party With Bourgeois Ideas--Criticizing Fang Lizhi's Erroneous Remarks Advocating Bourgeois Liberalization"]

[Text] Fang Lizhi, former deputy president of the University of Science and Technology, violated the four cardinal principles and made use of various opportunities to advocate bourgeois liberalization, slander and vilify the party's leadership, attack the socialist system, denigrate Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and sow discord between the party and intellectuals. He also tried to remove the party's leadership over the school. He has completely lost the qualifications to be a member of the Communist Party. It is completely necessary to expel him from the party and criticize his erroneous theory viewpoints. This will help maintain the party's character as the vanguard of the proletariat and help strengthen the party's combat effectiveness.

Our party is the vanguard of the proletariat, the faithful representative of the people's interests, and is composed of outstanding people who are loyal to the proletarian revolutionary cause. Marxism holds that whether a party can maintain its nature as the vanguard of the proletariat does not depend on its written program, but on whether the party can take the working class as its class base, and also on the political and ideological attitude of its members. That is, all party members must arm their minds with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and meet the requirements for Communist Party members. Comrade Liu Shaoqi pointed out: "The social origin of a party member cannot determine everything. The decisive thing is our party's ideological education, ideological leadership, and political leadership: ("Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi", Vol 1, p 325). Therefore, our party always emphasizes the importance of the party's ideological construction and always attaches importance to using proletarian ideology to transform and overcome all kinds of non-proletarian ideas inside the party. The party always places enhancing party members' political consciousness in the first position in party construction. Although Fang Lizhi joined the party in the organization aspect, he did not

join the party in the aspect of ideology. More seriously, he did not realize this, and did not transform himself in light of the standards for Communist Party members. Instead, he tried to transform the party with his bourgeois world outlook. He used hostile remarks to attack the party, saying that "the party is now black in color," and that "I agree that all of you join the party and then more and less change the color of the party. I formally declare to change the party." Proceeding from the bourgeois stand, Fang Lizhi confused everything. He admired bourgeois democracy, praised the bourgeois parliamentary system and the capitalist educational system, and completely negated our country's socialist construction. He even said flagrantly: "I think that the socialist system we have built in the past 30 years is a complete failure. From Marx and Lenin to Stalin and Mao Zedong, orthodox socialism so far is a failure." It is obvious that his attempt to "change the party" meant nothing but changing our goal and our party's class nature. That is, to change our party from a proletarian party into a bourgeois party. It is no wonder that he was finally expelled from the party.

Here, we are also faced with such a question. That is, how should intellectual party members treat their relations with the party? Can they regard themselves as special party members who can be free from the binding force of the party program, constitution, and discipline, and can even openly publish hostile statements against the party and socialism because they are intellectuals or famous scholars, professors, and experts? No, they are certainly not allowed to do so.

Our party has always highly valued the role of intellectuals, holding that without the participation of intellectuals, the revolution would not be successful. Because intellectuals have received better education and have more knowledge, it is easier for them to accept the influence of the Marxist world outlook and they can more quickly understand the objective regularity of social development. Comrade Chen Yun pointed out: "Many of them can fight bravely for correct political orientation. Because of their educational level and political consciousness, they can act as a necessary bridge between the party and the masses" ("Selected Works of Chen Yun" p 68) However, intellectuals also have their own shortcomings and weak points. Due to the limitations of their work environment, they are apt to look down on practice and lay one-sided stress on theory. Because they are mainly engaged in individual work, they are apt to exaggerate the role of individuals and lack the ability to restrain themselves in the aspect of discipline.

Lenin said: "Their characteristics, in general and as a whole, are individualism and an inability to accept a sense of discipline and organization." ("Concise Course in the History of the CPSU" p 52) Therefore, after joining the party, intellectual party members still need to transform themselves. This also applies to all party members, no matter whether they are workers, peasants, or intellectuals, and no matter what position they hold in the party nor what experience they have had. On this point, they are all ordinary party members and there are no exceptions. Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, the party has corrected the previous "leftist"

mistake in the matter of intellectuals, and has officially announced that intellectuals are part of the working class. The party has recruited a number of progressive elements among scholars and experts, thus adding fresh blood to the body of the party and changing the knowledge structure of party organizations at various levels. This is favorable to adapting our party organizations to the situation of reform and opening up, and to the party's more effective leadership over the modernization construction. This is completely correct. With the development of science and education and the enhancement of the educational level of the general public, the proportion of intellectuals in our party will continue to grow. This is an objective tendency. However, we should not inappropriately exaggerate the role of intellectuals. It is wrong to say that "intellectuals form the most advanced part," and that "they are not only people who can be trusted and relied on, but are also people who can lead the trend." This erroneous idea will only cause antagonism between intellectuals and the working masses and harm the unity of the working class. The party highly values and respects intellectuals. Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out: "The whole party and the general public should really respect knowledge and really bring the role of intellectuals into full play." ("Building Socialism With Chinese Characteristics" p 43) Intellectuals should notice their own shortcomings and weak points. No matter how famous they are or how high their position, after joining the party they must meet the requirements for all party members, and must not regard themselves as special party members who can enjoy privileges. Fang Lizhi enjoyed the honor of being a party member, but he did not subject himself to being bound by the party constitution and discipline. He made use of various forums to attack and vilify the party. Such people cannot continue to exist inside the party.

The CPC is the force at the core leading our cause forward, and it is also the center of thought of people throughout the country. Only the party can grasp the regularity of social development, point out the correct orientation for the country to advance, and arm the people with the advanced socialist ideology to strive for the fulfillment of their historical mission. However, Fang Lizhi tried to shift the center of thought from the party central leadership to the universities. He said that "the university should become the center of independent ideas, independent from the government" and that there should not be "any external instructor above the university."

Can the universities act as the center for the whole country's thoughts? The basic task for universities is to train qualified personnel for the modernization cause, so it is of great significance to do a good job in scientific research and education in the universities. However, the universities cannot act as the decisionmaking and guiding center of the whole country. They do not perform the function of giving ideological guidance to the country's political and social life. If the universities became the center of thought, this would not only go against their social functions, but would also completely negate the necessity of the CPC's existence as a ruling party. Here, Fang Lizhi also raised the question of whether a socialist university should be subject to the leadership of the party. According to the Marxist

viewpoint, the party should exercise leadership over everything. Socialist universities must also accept the party's leadership, and its work in all fields must be subject to Marxist guidance. Comrade Zhou Enlai once expounded on deeply this point. He said: "Leadership over scientific work includes two aspects. In one aspect, it is academic leadership; in the other it is political and administrative leadership. As for academic affairs, we never try to interfere in them. In this respect our leadership principle is 'to let a hundred schools of thought contend with each other.' That is, academic issues should be solved through free debates in academic circles and through practice. However, affairs concerning political thought, principles, policies, and plans in scientific work need the leadership of the party and the government" ("Government Work Report," 26 June 1957). Practice shows that if we do not adhere to the party's leadership in the universities, we would not be able to guarantee the socialist orientation of our education and would not be able to train qualified personnel who are both professionally competent and politically faithful for the modernization cause, and our universities would be transformed by the bourgeois ideology. This would then fundamentally endanger our socialist system as a whole. Fang Lizhi advocated that the universities should "become the center of independent thoughts" and that there should be no "instructor" above the universities. His real purpose was to contend with the party for leadership over the universities. He tried to dominate the schools and run the schools in light of the bourgeois ideas he had advocated so as to bring our schools onto the bourgeois road. Of course, this can only be a fond dream and can never be realized.

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'CONTRIBUTIONS' STRESSED OVER 'DEMANDS'

HK100313 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Jan 87 p 3

[Article by Liu Mingfu: "Is It 'Not Scientific' To Advocate the Spirit of Dedication?"]

[Text] Not long ago, while talking about the problem of building socialist spiritual civilization, some people did not agree with advocating the spirit of dedication and said that "although the so-called view that 'the significance of life is to dedicate oneself but not to demand' was pleasant to hear, it was not scientific." I hold that the facts are exactly the contrary and that it is the view dissenting from the advocating of dedication that is not scientific.

The value of life is in dedicating oneself. This is not only advocated by Communist Party member, but is the conviction of many scientists who aspire to serve mankind. The famous scientist Einstein said: "When we judge the value of a man, we must judge what he has dedicated and not what he has taken." Could Einstein, as a scientist, not know what the significance of life is? People who have read the "Collected Works of Einstein" know that with the same scientific attitude as that with which he studied the "special theory of relativity," he repeatedly explored the significance of life. His final conclusion was: "Only by dedicating himself to society can man discover the significance of an actually transient and hazardous life." This is no doubt a scientific summation of the experience of his whole life.

Man cannot live if he is divorced from society. As a member of society, he has a duty to make contributions toward society. If all of us want only to make demands on society but not to dedicate ourselves to society, society cannot exist and progress. All people with a scientific mind and a sense of responsibility will not find it hard to understand that advocating dedication is an objective requirement for social progress and historical development.

It is true that as there are different "outlooks on life" in society, there are different views on the value of life. There are the outlooks on life that some benefit themselves at the expense of others, that some want only to make demands but not to dedicate themselves, and that some are unwilling to give up even a hair to benefit the world. The outlook on life of our

Communist Party members and people's fighters should be that they should wholeheartedly serve the people and act as the public servants of society. Therefore, we must not regard how much we demand and possess as our aim and pleasure, but must regard as our important duties the seeking of the interests of the people and society and the promotion of historical development. From this, we can see that the different aims in life determine the criteria for measuring the value of life. If you can improve the livelihood of the people through your contributions, your "life" is valuable to the people. Conversely, if you want only to make demands, but disregard others' gains or losses, do not make any contributions toward society, and even benefit yourself at the expense of others, your "life" is of no value to the people and is even a negative factor.

Some people hold that "the relationship between contributions and demands is the relationship between production and consumption and no one can have bias against either of them." In fact, this view itself is not scientific. The relationship between contributions and demands involves the question outlook on life and the question of ideals and morals, while the relationship between production and consumption involves the question of economic relationships. The two belong to different categories. How can they be confused? Production and consumption do not stand side by side but promote each other. It is production, not consumption, that plays a decisive part, and consumption cannot be put first. This is elementary knowledge in political economy. Whether contributions or demands are advocated reflects people's ideological trend. We have always stressed dedication, advocated increased dedication, and where necessary, dedicated our lives. This does not negate distribution according to work and individual interests, but carries forward the revolutionary spirit of dedicating our lives and recognizes the aim of our party and army. If we do not stress contributions or advocate dedication, but only advocate demands, and if doing otherwise is "not scientific," can the ideas and actions of the heroes on the Laoshan battlefield who have shed their blood at the southern border for the peace of our motherland without making any demands, be called "not scientific"? If everyone in our society holds that this spirit of dedication is "not scientific," abandons it, makes personal demands, disregards the safety of, or danger to, the state and the interests of the people, and even stresses "exchange of equal value" everywhere, who will be willing to help the distressed and succour those in peril, to deal with emergencies and provide disaster relief, and to fight in wars to defend the country?

Some people also say that people generally cannot dedicate themselves selflessly and that advocating dedication serves to encourage the custom of hypocrisy in society and is not beneficial to the building of socialist spiritual civilization. This makes it hard for people to understand. In our society, there are really things which are not beneficial to the building of spiritual civilization. They are such statements as refuting "selflessness" and "justifying individualism," as well as the unhealthy trend of impairing the interests of others, of the collective, and of the state under various pretexts. These bad phenomena are really the characteristics of those who stress not contributions but "demands." Some are keen on demands. They want

to demand more personal gain and pretend to be open and aboveboard and reasonable and legitimate, and have therefore compiled some so-called "scientific" theories for their "demands." It is those promoting their private interests under the guise of serving the public and seeking private ends under the pretext of "science," and not those advocating dedication, that "encourage the custom of hypocrisy in society." Those who dedicate themselves and who sincerely serve the people will surely have their personal interests but always put the interests of the people and the country above everything else. They take pride in making more contributions and fewer demands, and not otherwise. It is impractical to require everyone to dedicate themselves selflessly, but this is not a reason for opposing advocating the spirit of dedication. One of the important contents of building socialist spiritual civilization is advocating this selfless spirit of dedication. Only by so doing can we train more noble-minded persons, persons who have morality and who benefit the people, and persons without vulgar interests. The more there are of this kind of person, the better will be the general mood of our society and the quicker will be the progress of modernization.

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JIEFANGJUN BAO ON NEED TO MAINTAIN COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

HK140846 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Gong Xikui (1362 1585 7608): "Party Members Should Exercise Their Democratic Rights To Safeguard the Party Program"]

[Text] During the 1840's, communists headed by Marx and Engels conducted an acute polemic with Proudhonists under the signboard of "real socialism." At a meeting attended by all communists, a Proudhonist called (Eiseman) attacked communism wantonly. In this connection, Engels demonstrated his firm stand and his high principles as a communist by speaking sternly out of a sense of justice: "Before going ahead with the discussion, we have to determine whether we are attending the meeting as communists. If this is the case, we should pay attention to avoiding the reoccurrence of attacking communism, as (Eiseman) has done. If anybody may come here to discuss this or that question randomly, there is no need for me to get in touch with them, and I will not come here again in the future." ("Selected Letters of Marx and Engels," p 14) Engels, as a communist, refuted (Eiseman's) fallacy.

At that time, although communist organizations had not yet formulated their mature programs, Engels attached importance to the purity of the communist groups. He pointed out that a meeting of communists should not be attended by "people in general." Belief in communism was a prerequisite for attending such meeting. Without such prerequisite, there would be no common political foundation, and the meeting would become a gathering of an disorderly hand. Today, reviewing Engel's practical activities, we find out that they are still of immediate significance.

During a certain period of time in the past, at certain party meetings, or on certain open occasions, there occurred an abnormal phenomenon. Some party members went so far as to deviate from the party Constitution and program, and the line, guiding principle and policies of the party, and talked irresponsibly. They threw overboard communist beliefs, the fate of the party and state, and the interests of the people. Instead of correctly propagating and explaining the party program and the correct party line, they arbitrarily distorted or negated them. That was not all. A handful of persons, who wore the cloak of Communist Party members, took the opportunity to deliver speeches at gatherings and writing articles to preach bourgeois liberalization, openly

oppose the practice of upholding the four cardinal principles, attack the party leadership, vilify socialist system, and advocate "complete Westernization." Their erroneous views have caused ideological confusion inside and outside the party, and severely undermined the present favorable situation of stability and unity. It is absolutely necessary for our party to firmly fight against bourgeois liberalization.

Some people think they are entitled to enjoy the so-called unbound "democracy," whether at party meetings or of any occasion, and that one can say and do anything he likes. It is true that to carry forward democracy, we must enjoy freedom of speech. This has been clearly stipulated in the party Constitution and the Constitution of our country. However, as Communist Party members, they must observe the discipline and principle contained in our party constitution, and the Constitution of our country. Party members exercise their democratic rights, but this must be beneficial to safeguarding the party line, guiding principle and policies, and keeping in line with the party Central Committee. Taking the opportunity of carrying forward "democracy" to openly oppose the party constitution, program, line, guiding principle and policies is not tolerated by the party discipline. With regard to a handful of Communist Party members who oppose the party leadership, we should seriously criticize their mistakes and struggle against them, or even expel them from the party. Only in so doing can we preserve the purity of the contingent of party members, protect the image of the party, and educate the broad masses of party members and people in order to push the cause of our party forward.

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STATE EDUCATION COMMISSION SUPPORTS HIRING OF FOREIGN EXPERTS

Beijing ZHONGGUO JIAOYU BAO in Chinese 5 Feb 87 p 1

[Article by Liu Baoli [0491 1405 0448]: "China Will Continue To Hire Foreign Teachers and Experts During the Period of the Seventh 5-Year Plan"]

[Text] At a recent meeting of relevant departments of the State Education Commission, it was emphatically stated that the hiring of foreign teachers and experts to teach at China's institutions of higher education is an integral aspect of our policy of opening to the outside world. Notable accomplishments were gained in this work during the Sixth 5-Year Plan, which will be further developed during the period of the Seventh 5-Year Plan.

In recent years, China's institutions of higher education have followed a definite plan in inviting foreign teachers and experts to teach or give lectures. According to incomplete statistics, nearly 400 institutions have done so by this time. During the period of the Sixth 5-Year Plan, 3,000 foreign experts, 2,000 foreign teachers of general studies, and 17,000 foreign experts who lectured on a short-term basis came to China upon invitation. They came from 52 foreign countries and regions including the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Australia, West Germany and the Soviet Union, and taught at institutions throughout 29 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions.

Practice has shown that hiring foreign teachers and experts has contributed significantly to raising China's standards in higher education and scientific research. For instance, in foreign language training, a field in which China is relatively weak, the hiring of many foreign experts and teachers has enabled our institutions of higher education to raise their standards of foreign language instruction across the board after a few years of hard work and to cultivate a large group of foreign language teachers. Another result is that Chinese students who have gone overseas for advanced study are able to pass foreign language tests with little difficulty. Furthermore, the hiring of and cooperation with foreign experts has resulted in more rapid scientific development, in promoting Chinese-foreign academic exchange, in enriching our teaching materials, and in improving friendship and understanding between the Chinese people and foreigners.

China's overall plan for educational development calls for continued hiring of the best foreign experts and teachers for the system of higher education throughout the period of the Seventh 5-Year Plan. Those institutions of higher education that are able will gradually shift their focus from hiring foreign teachers and experts to developing specialized disciplines, new fields of study, frontier science majors, and key research tasks established by the state. Joint training of doctoral students and cooperation with foreigners in scientific research will also be emphasized.

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STUDENT UNREST THREATENS REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN

Zhengzhou HENAN RIBAO in Chinese 6 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Lu Xiaoyin [7627 4562 5419]: "Peaceful Unification of the Motherland Requires Stability and Unity"]

[Text] Earth-shaking changes have taken place in our country in the 8 years since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, and as a result, we are enjoying political stability, healthy economic development, and greater international prestige. Living standards have improved, and our attractiveness to overseas Chinese has increased. And it is only under such circumstances that the goal of China's unification with Taiwan can be realized. With the Hong Kong problem resolved, the pace for reuniting the mainland with Taiwan should pick up. However, just when compatriots both within and outside of China were working hard for an early realization of the goal of peaceful unification, a minority of university students, having been inadvertently affected by the bourgeois liberalization advocated by Fang Lizhi and some others, took to the streets and created disturbances. And this cast a shadow over Chinese people both at home and abroad who are longing for the reunification of China and Taiwan.

As we are all aware, political stability is the very foundation upon which peaceful unification can be realized. Without this foundation, peaceful unification becomes empty talk. Taking to the streets reminds of the 10 tumultuous years of the "Cultural Revolution" when a similar plight befell the people, and overseas Chinese were dismayed upon hearing of it. How can we promote China's unification under such circumstances? Should similar turmoil really break out, our compatriots in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan would resist the grand call for reunification. The enlightened policies proclaimed at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee have enabled us to abandon past errors by embarking with one mind upon the four modernizations. And as a result, our society has rapidly begun to flourish, we are enjoying greater political stability, and the motherland now exerts greater appeal. It was under these circumstances that our government and the British government recognized that the time was right for negotiations on Hong Kong, and in just 2 years' time arrived at a satisfactory solution. As to the Taiwan issue, Chinese people on both sides of the strait have been calling increasingly for peaceful unification because of the improved situation on the mainland. Facing pressures made possible by our political stability and improved economy, the Kuomintang authorities now cannot but make political adjustments in Taiwan by abandoning intransigent positions and becoming politically flexible. In the wake of our successfully implementing reforms, even those

Chinese residing overseas who used to be hostile to socialist China are watching us with interest and are willing to abandon formerly unfavorable attitudes toward us. All of this serves to illustrate that political stability and unity, and a strengthened socialist motherland, are major prerequisites for realizing our goal of reunification with Taiwan.

Much work remains to be done before we can realize this goal. Therefore, we hope that young students will clearly understand their historical duty by treasuring their time, being more diligent at study, and learning how to be of greater service to the people. Whatever they have acquired from their education and work experience will have profound influence on the future of our country and reunification with Taiwan. So students should not sadden us and gladden the enemy by taking to the street to create disturbances.

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SELECTIVE FOREIGN BORROWING COMPLEMENTS CHINESE SOCIALISM

Zhengzhou HENAN RIBAO in Chinese 6 Mar 87 p 3

[Article by Xu Youguang [1776 2589 0342]: "Reform, Opening, and Socialism With Chinese Characteristics"]

[Excerpt] We should study and import only those things that are "advanced," "useful," or "generally suitable;" indiscriminate importing is absolutely unacceptable. Furthermore, whatever we import and study must undergo scrutiny for acceptance through experimentation, analysis, critical examination, and digestion; it should never be accepted uncritically. For example, capitalist-style management, like the capitalist production process, possesses a dual nature. We should certainly study and take lessons from those experiences that reflect universally applicable laws of mass production. But we must refuse to study and adopt, and soberly resist and criticize, those so-called "experiences" that represent the capitalist's theft of surplus labor value to oppress and exploit the workers. We must bear in mind that the objective of socialist production is to satisfy the people's ever-increasing material and cultural needs. This is fundamentally opposed to the objective of capitalist production, which is pursuit of surplus profit. The construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics must be based upon the principle of self-reliance and independence. "Our policy of opening to the outside world, studying foreign technology, and using imported foreign capital are only supplements to socialist construction." China's experience of the past 100 years clearly demonstrates that closing our door to foreigners has led to stagnation and backwardness, while blindly following the foreigners' lead at every step has subjected us to their control. Therefore, we should adhere to current policies concerning what we import and opening to the outside world, while absolutely refusing to indiscriminately and totally imitate capitalism. Only thus can we develop socialism with Chinese characteristics.

CSO: 4005/494

SHENYANG MR COMMANDER STRESSES DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

Shenyang SHENYANG RIBAO in Chinese 24 Jan 87 p 1

[Article by Zhang Zhe [1728 0772] and Liu Wende [0491 2429 1795]]

[Summary] "The task at present concerning party building lies in firmly upholding the four cardinal principles and taking a clear-cut stand in opposing bourgeois liberalization." These were the words of Shenyang Military Region Commander Liu Jingsong at the 11th congress of party delegates [dishiyci dangdaihui 4574 0577 0001 2945 8093 0108 2585], which met from 18 to 23 January at the Shenyang Military Region Headquarters.

Commander Liu said: As far as party building is concerned, there are many issues that need to be seriously pursued. But to bring about strong leadership in every party cell, department and regional organization, we must uphold democratic centralism and party collective leadership. This is the fundamental means of achieving party reconstruction. Every party cadre must self-consciously observe the principle of democratic centralism, and under the collective leadership of the party committee and branch see to the fulfillment of his individual duties and self-consciously accept supervision by the masses.

Liu also remarked: In order to do a good job of party building, we must insist that individuals live according to party instructions. Although the peak period of party rectification has passed, this does not necessarily mean that we have reached a point where the ideology, organization and workstyle of our party have been purified. There are many problems facing us. How to purify party workstyle and correct unhealthy tendencies remain long-term tasks. This is why we emphasize that individuals live properly in compliance with party instructions.

The conference [huiyi 2585 6231] also held enthusiastic discussions concerning how to uphold the four cardinal principles and strengthen party building. The meeting also commended Wang Youting [3769 1635 1656], an intellectual who gave his life in the border regions for the revolution, and 20 model units and individuals.

CSO: 4005/445

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DISCUSS IMAGE, MORAL ISSUES

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 6 Dec 86 p 3

[Article by Zhang Shusheng [1728 6615 5110]: "Qualities of a Modern University Student"]

[Text] A critical report has triggered a heated discussion on the campus of Lanzhou University concerning the image of modern university students and their moral goals.

The critical report, which appeared in ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO on 22 October, told of a Lanzhou University student who, seated by the window on board a train, turned down requests by an elderly and seriously sick man to trade places. Despite denunciations by the passengers around him, the student defiantly insisted that he would not "give up minor interests." Within a few days after the report appeared, Lanzhou University received letters from scores of "contemporaries" at colleges around the country who all denounced their fellow student for "damaging the image of modern university students."

For awhile the critical report and the responses of numerous "contemporaries" became the leading topic of conversation on Lanzhou University campus. The university had the report reprinted and distributed to various departments and posted the dozens of letters it received from outside the university to solicit comments from students and spark their thinking.

Chinese Department '84, which was the first to set up a special topic board, put out such articles as "The Criticism of ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO and Our Reflections," "On Not Giving Up the Most Minor Interests," "Come Back, Etiquette and Righteousness," and "Me Remodeled." Other department boards followed suit and became the forum where students elucidated and argued moral values using various ideologies. From the outset, Marxism, existentialism, Confucianism--all ideologies were put forward as the basis of reasoning at lectures sponsored by the Law Department, Philosophy Department, the part-time party school at Lanzhou University, and a string of organizations that had sprung up spontaneously. After discussions, however, a consensus was reached among a majority of students that "moral standards vary from individual to individual. Given the large number of university students, we should not be alarmed that one of them brought shame upon himself. But we had better face up to realities, clearly distinguish between right and wrong in our minds, and

examine our conduct through discussion." Even as they affirmed their own values, students saw the foibles in some people--arrogance and selfishness. This got them thinking. They scrutinized their behavior, went in for moral soul-searching, and proposed that "one should not blame society while shirking one's responsibility."

The discussion reached a climax at a lecture entitled "University Students and Morals" organized by the students' union on 18 November. Over 400 students voluntarily attended the gathering and more than 40 mounted the podium to speak. Hu Zhide [5170 0037 1795], president of the university, sat among the students, exchanged views with them as an equal, and also made a speech about the kind of spiritual outlook and moral goals modern university students should have. President Hu Zhide said, "A modern university student should use his talent to create the future and be happy to work hard and get things done for society. He should have a spirit of sacrifice. He should also have a pioneering spirit, ready to make innovations and push society forward under certain circumstances through extensive social practice. He should have a sound personality and be able to develop his individuality among a group and exercise group leadership as an individual. He should be morally equipped to carry forward the virtues of the Chinese nation and correctly handle inter-person relations."

The party committee and Communist Youth League committee at Lanzhou University believe that it is a good thing to have people disagreeing with one another. Despite the division of opinion among students regarding moral concepts, they can enhance their understanding and improve themselves morally through discussion and comparison.

12581
CSO: 4005/245

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

NEED TO IMPLEMENT PARTY LINE OF THIRD PLENARY SESSION

HK031505 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 23 Jan 87 p 1

[Commentator's article: "Firmly Grasp Two Basic Points of the Line of the Third Plenary Session"]

[Text] Will the emphasis on adhering to the four cardinal principles and the opposition to bourgeois liberalization affect the implementation of the line, principles, domestic and foreign policies formulated since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee and hinder reform, opening up, and the efforts to invigorate the economy? This is a question in the hearts of many people. Recently, Comrade Zhao Ziyang gave a definite and unequivocal answer to this question, and clearly expounded the basic spirit of the party's line since the Third Plenary Session. He pointed out the dialectical relationship between the adherence to the four cardinal principles and reform, opening up, and enlivening the economy, showing that the two aspects are inseparable. We must deeply understand this important idea, because this can help us clarify the confused ideas, resolutely and properly carry out the struggle against bourgeois liberalization, and become more conscientious in implementing the line of the Third Plenary Session.

What is the line of the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee? It has two basic points: First , to adhere to the four cardinal principles; and second, to carry out all-round reform, open up to the outside world, and enliven the domestic economy. We precisely rely on these two things in building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Practice shows that it is very important to grasp these two points in order to understand the basic spirit of the line of the Third Plenary Session. Wang Ruowang, Fang Lizhi, and a very small number of people who advocate bourgeois liberalization flaunted cardinal principles, oppose the party's leadership, and negate the socialist system. They certainly cherished some sinister intentions, and their problem is completely different from some comrades' problem of understanding. Some comrades did not really understand the essence of the line of the Third Plenary Session, and their deviations mainly derived from their failure to grasp the two basic points of this line. For example, some of our comrades are worried that the opposition to bourgeois liberalization may hinder reform, opening up, and enlivening the economy; some other comrades, however, doubt reform, opening up, and enlivening the economy because of some negative phenomena. Their viewpoints are all one-sided, and they cannot consider things by integrating the two basic points of the line of Third Plenary Session. So we should seriously solve this problem in some people's minds.

The four cardinal principles form the foundation for building our country, while reform, opening up, and enlivening the economy are the basic national policies. As Comrade Zhao Ziyang said, their relationship is integrated and neither of the two parts is dispensable. Why are they indispensable to each other? This is because we are building the four modernizations of socialism, and they are both indispensable to a socialist modern country with our national characteristics. The four cardinal principles guarantee the correct orientation of reform, opening up, and enlivening the economy and ensure their healthy development. Without the four cardinal principles, reform, opening up, and economic invigoration would lose their theoretical foundation and correct guideline, and would thus deviate from the socialist orientation. However, if we do not carry out reform, open up to the outside world, and enliven the economy, we might backtrack to the rigid mode of the 1950's and 1960's and to the condition of national seclusion, and our economic construction would thus lose vigor and momentum, then we would not be able to build any socialism with Chinese characteristics. Therefore, to build socialism with Chinese characteristics, we must adhere to the four cardinal principles, and must also carry out reform, open up to the outside world, and enliven the economy. The adherence of the four cardinal principles cannot be separated from the great practice of reform, opening up, and economic invigoration; at the same time, reform, opening up, and economic invigoration cannot succeed without the guidance and guarantee of the four cardinal principles. In view of the trend of bourgeois liberalization which spread widely in the ideological field, we vividly give publicity to the four cardinal principles in the struggle so as to raise the people's political consciousness. This will help more accurately implement the line of the Third Plenary Session rather than affect its implementation, and will help more successfully carry out reform, open up to the outside world, and enliven the economy so as to advance our socialist modernization cause.

The PLA is the main pillar of the people's democratic dictatorship, and the construction of the army is an important part of the construction of the country. Undoubtedly, our army's reform and construction in various fields have been carried out and are still being carried out under the guidance of the line of the Third Plenary Session, and advance steadily under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Central Military Commission, on the basis of adhering to the four cardinal principles and making significant reforms and innovations. In order to adapt the army to the strategic change of the guiding principle for building the army, we have reduced it by 1 million troops. We smoothly and successfully completed such a major change precisely because we continue to strengthen the ideological and political work in the army and are resolved to advance the reform under the guidance of the four cardinal principles. Our comrades in the army have deeply realized that reform gives hope to the army. Without carrying out reform, the army would not be able to "streamline" itself and to adapt itself to the requirements in the new period, and we would not be able to build a modern and regular revolutionary army. We have also more deeply realized that the four cardinal principles are the foundation for building the army. Without adhering to the four cardinal principles, the army's reform and construction would deviate from the correct course, and the people's army would face the danger of changing its character. On the basis of adhering to the four cardinal principles and maintaining the correct political orientation, the whole army from top to bottom acts in line with the overall interests,

thus making great achievements in the work of troop reduction and reorganization. We should seriously sum up this valuable experience and carry it forward. Under the correct leadership of the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, taking a firm stand and a clear-cut attitude in adhering to the four cardinal principles, standing in the forefront of the struggle against bourgeois liberalization, and raising the consciousness in carrying out the line of the 2d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee is an important task for all comrades in the army. We must continue to make greater efforts!

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

PLA DISSEMINATES LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AMONG ARMY UNITS

OW120549 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0127 GMT 11 Feb 87

[Excerpts] Beijing, 11 February (XINHUA)--The work of disseminating legal knowledge has begun in all units of the PLA.

Beginning the second year of the army-wide campaign to spread legal knowledge throughout the entire army, 1987 holds the key to the 3-year campaign's success or failure. The PLA General Political Department has decided that this year's emphasis is to be laid on spreading legal knowledge among the cadres and new recruits. Units which have already fulfilled this task should make education in the legal system a regular practice.

According to the instructions of leading comrades of the Central Military Commission, beginning this year, various units throughout the army should regard legal knowledge as a principal component in political education for new recruits, gradually mold them into law-abiding and discipline-observing soldiers from the first day they enter military camp, and lay a good, ideological foundation for transforming ordinary civilians into "four haves [have ideals, morality, knowledge, and physical strength]" soldiers.

In spreading legal knowledge, the entire army has stressed the enhancement of leading cadres' ability to make strategic scientific decisions, based on law, and improving the basic-level cadres' ability to manage army units with appropriate laws, and army rules and regulations. The general headquarters and military regions of the PLA have set an example in studying and applying the law. The General Political Department has held three report meetings on spreading legal knowledge. The General Logistics Department has sponsored six lecture sessions on law, attended by cadres at and above army level. General Staff Headquarters has run five training classes for leading cadres to study the legal system on a rotational basis. Since various departments under General Staff Headquarters have close contacts with the social, economic, diplomatic, cultural, scientific, and technological sectors, many leading cadres, after studying the basics of the "constitution," have also studied law specifically related to their work. For instance, the Engineering Corps Department has studied land and forestry laws; the Armed Forces Department has studied laws and regulations on economic contracts; and departments related to foreign affairs have studied international laws and regulations. To implement the "Environment Protection Law" and give better protection to the environment, the Chemical Defense Corps has revised and improved related regulations and ordinances in the training outline.

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

AIR FORCE OFFICES PROMOTE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

OW300551 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0012 GMT 27 Jan 87

[By reporter Zhu Hao]

[Text] Beijing, 27 January (XINHUA)--Air Force offices have set professional ethics for 99 categories of personnel. As a result, official business is now handled and services are provided in a civilized way in those offices and units using them.

Education in professional ethics was started in Air Force offices late last November. On the basis of achieving unity in thinking and raising their personnel's understanding, various departments have laid down their professional ethics according to their actual conditions and professional characteristics. Cadre departments stress "impartiality and honesty, appointing people on their merits, upholding principles, treating people warmly, and strictly observing discipline." Finance departments call for "managing financial matters according to regulations and being honest in performing official business." Communication departments call for "enthusiastically providing services as well as prompt and smooth communication." Literature and art departments call for "setting a moral example and achieving glory by writing and making progress in both art and morality." Discipline inspection departments stress "promoting healthy tendencies, checking unhealthy ones, handling official business impartially, being selfless and fearless, being upright, and never stooping to fawning."

Various departments have also adopted concrete measures to implement their professional ethics and regard such ethics as an important aspect in selecting advanced individuals and evaluating cadres. Some departments have also posted their professional ethics and mobilized the masses to supervise one another in implementing their professional ethics and to improve them.

In developing their professional ethics, Air Force offices have paid attention to laying down rules and encouraging people to act according to such rules and to improve their work. Order in those offices is good, and their work efficiency has also noticeably improved. In view of complaints from the basic units that "it is hard to get into some offices, to get along with people there, and to get things done there," the Aeronautical Engineering Department has provided civilized service in receiving people from basic units. It has

enthusiastically arranged board and lodging for personnel from basic units, has enthusiastically answered their questions, and has warmly sent them off. Transport teams, mess halls, service agencies, hostels, outpatient clinics, and other service units under the Air Force have generally made efforts to provide quality services, and their attitudes in serving people have noticeably improved. To make it convenient for old and weak people who have difficulty getting about to receive medical care, the outpatient clinic of the Air Force Logistics Department has sent doctors to visit them in their houses and to provide them with medicines. People happily say that many new things have emerged in the course of conducting education in professional ethics.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

DISCIPLINE, CORRUPTION PROBLEMS IN PLA

Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU [STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] in Chinese Vol 20,
No 10, 15 Oct 86 pp 69-76

[Article by Li Ch'un-lei [2621 2504 7191]: "Current Serious Situation of Poor Discipline and Corruption in Chinese Communist Armed Forces"]

[Text] I. Foreword

Since the Chinese communists began the "streamlining and reorganization" of their armed forces, military cadres universally face the problems of "advancing or withdrawing, leaving or staying," and many of them are unable to keep their minds on their work in the units. There has emerged on a wide scale "if you want to be comparatively well-off, then you better doff the uniform," "it's better to leave earlier than later," and other ideas of "beating the retreat," to such an extent that "their bodies are in the units but their hearts are in the localities." They muddle along in their work, passively cope with things, and are not in the mood to subject others to discipline in the companies. Even more cadres of the communist army think that the guiding ideology for building the Chinese communist army has switched from the "brink-of-war state" of being provisionally prepared to fight a war to that of a period of "peaceful construction," and they think that "in any case a war will not be fought, so it doesn't matter if management is a little slack." Thus there has appeared the phenomenon of the "four slacks," namely, "slack in ideology, slack in rules and regulations, slack in management, and slack in discipline," (Footnote 1) (16 June 1986, JIEFANGJUN BAO [LIBERATION DAILY--LAD], p 1) daily causing a more serious situation of indiscipline and corruption in the communist army. On 7 March this year (1986), the General Staff Department of the communist army, for this reason, held a "meeting on rectifying the discipline, appearance, bearing, and conduct of military forces stationed in the capital." At the meeting Yang Dezhi [2779 1799 1807], "chief of staff" of the communist army, made the demand for further "strengthening education on management to put the troops in gallant array with good discipline." (Footnote 2) (8 March 1986 LAD p 1) On 3 July, Yu Qiuli [0151 4428 6849], director of the communist army's "General Political Department," at an "all-army report-back meeting on correcting party style and consolidating the party," confessed that a new unhealthy trend has now appeared in the communist army. He said that, besides strictly enforcing the "three main rules of discipline and eight points for attention," the "eight

"prohibitions" must be enforced: it is prohibited to beat, curse, or corporally punish fighters; prohibited to accept gifts from fighters; prohibited for cadres to infringe on the fighters' interests; prohibited to fine fighters; prohibited to get drunk; prohibited to gamble; prohibited to look at obscene things; and prohibited to practice fraud. Yang Shangkun [2799 1424 2492], deputy chairman of the "Central Military Commission," at the same time announced: the "eight prohibitions" are a new supplement for the "three main rules of discipline and eight points for attention," and they must become the laws and regulations of the armed forces and be conscientiously enforced by all units. (Footnote 3) (9 August 1986, Central People's Broadcasting Station) On 9 August, JIEFANGJUN BAO published a commentator's article entitled "New Standards." It pointed out that the prominent problems currently existing in the communist army are that "discipline is not strict, work style is lax, and the methods of imposing discipline are inappropriate." It pointed out that the core of the "eight prohibitions" is good cadre management. From the series of measures taken by the communist army to strengthen and rectify discipline, it can be seen that the current situation in military discipline and corruption is extremely serious. This article will be a summary of specific facts in recent years about the communist army's military discipline and corruption, and the difficult problems encountered in rectifying military discipline, in order to provide reference materials.

II. The Serious Situation of Discipline, Appearance, and Bearing Not Being in Good Order

Since the Chinese communist armed forces adopted the new uniform on 1 May 1985, even though they have taken a series of measures for education on discipline and demanded strict discipline, appearance, and bearing, because of the effect in the "streamlining and reorganization" period of management being lax and morale low, the situation of discipline, appearance, and bearing not being in good order up to now not only has not improved but instead has tended to become more serious. The "Military Affairs Department of the General Staff Department" of the communist army once sent out inspection teams that sampled and inspected the situation in discipline, appearance, and bearing of units, organizations, colleges and schools in various places after the change of uniform. They discovered that the following phenomena widely existed:

A. The wearing of the uniform and the stitching of cap insignia, collar insignia, and shoulder insignia were not done according to regulations, so that the fittings and stitching were wrong, and the situation with respect to individuals changing the style of their uniforms on their own was serious.

B. When military men went outside their camps, the phenomenon of discipline, bearing, and conduct not being in good order was serious. For example, cases of not wearing the military cap, carrying the uniform, wearing a mixture of the uniform and civilian clothing and a mixture of the new and old uniform, nibbling snacks while walking, and laughing and fooling around were extremely widespread.

C. Some enlisted men wore their uniforms while engaging in sideline occupations, and they mingled with street peddlers at agricultural and trade fairs, contending with them in hawking wares; other members of the communist army lent uniforms and military caps to the populace as they pleased for photograph-taking purposes. (Footnote 4) (10 July 1985, LAD p 1)

In cooperation with the communist army's "disciplinary personnel for inspecting discipline, bearing, appearance, and conduct," JIEFANGJUN BAO reporters went the rounds of the streets in Peking to take samples, and they discovered that very many problems still existed in the communist army's discipline, bearing, and appearance. Among them some are quite widespread, such as wearing the new-style uniform but wearing the old-style cap, opening the collar wide or not buttoning it right, growing long hair, putting hands behind their back, or in their pockets, having a poor posture, holding children while wearing the uniform and being on a street, women members of the army with their hair or pigtails too long, and wearing high-necked sweaters that reach higher than the collar. (Footnote 5) (1 March 1986, LAD p 1)

In view of the serious situation of discipline, bearing, and appearance not being in good order, the "General Staff Department" on 7 March this year held in Peiping a "meeting on rectifying discipline, bearing, appearance, and conduct of military forces stationed in Peiping." It stressed that management must be strengthened in order to put bearing, appearance, and discipline in good order, and for the first time demanded that the Military Commission, General Headquarters, and leadership organizations of all service arms, as well as the military forces stationed in the capital, first set an example for the entire army. The five major reasons for discipline, bearing, and appearance not being in good order that were discussed and reviewed at the meeting were:

A. Education is not thorough. The propaganda and education about the problem of discipline, bearing, and appearance are not effective. Newspapers and magazines, motion pictures, and television have not yet played an exemplary role in education with regard to the image of military men.

B. Management is not strict. The work by cadres is not responsible. What should be grasped is not grasped, what should be managed is not managed, to the extent that some leading cadres themselves do not stress the bearing of military men. People who do not act like leaders of troops naturally cannot manage and lead units well.

C. Rules and regulations are not implemented. The cadres have not yet implemented the rules and regulations. There exists a "psychology of never mind" with regard to the rules for discipline, bearing, appearance, and conduct, and they even misconstrue the rules as restricting individual freedom.

D. Training is not conscientious. Leading cadres ignore training in common topics. Regular cultivation is poor and its quality is low. The regulations and basic training in colleges and schools are not implemented. The management of the training of coaching regiment cadres varies, the training is disjointed, and attention has not yet been paid to training and cultivation of the military man's image.

E. Inspection of discipline is not competent. The units responsible for maintaining discipline, bearing, appearance, and conduct do not assume their responsibility. The checks by entrance guards are not strict. Discipline, bearing, and appearance do not matter and nobody bothers about them. (Footnote 6) (8 March 1986, LAD p 1)

For these reasons the "General Staff Department" put forward five major demands for rectifying military discipline: "education must be strengthened to heighten understanding; regulations must be implemented and rules strictly observed; training must be strict and cultivation tightly grasped; key points must be grasped and conscientiously rectified; and inspection of discipline must be tightly organized." On 5 May this year, it reissued certain rules on military discipline, clarifying rules about the military men's wearing of the uniform, appearance, and bearing, as well as the stitching of the cap insignia, collar insignia, shoulder insignia, and service arm (specialty) insignia. With regard to the organization, leadership, personnel, and support for the work of inspecting discipline, it set forth specific methods for solution, and stipulated:

A. The squad and platoon every day, the company every week, the battalion every half month, and the regiment every month must make one inspection of military discipline.

B. When military men go outside the camp, the company cadres or duty personnel must inspect their military discipline one by one and brief them on matters needing attention.

C. Guards at camp gates must be responsible for checking on the military discipline of military men coming and going, and those who do not meet the requirements must not be permitted to pass.

D. The military forces stationed in a city every day must dispatch discipline inspectors to busy districts, tourist areas, railway and bus stations, docks, and other places where fairly many military men come and go, and on holidays and days off the discipline inspection forces must be strengthened.

E. Single regiments stationed on defense and independent units at the battalion level and below must organize mobile discipline inspections in the barracks area and its vicinity. (Footnote 7) (7 May 1986, LAD p 1)

To implement these rules, the units of the communist army are now separately setting up "discipline inspection groups" for roving patrols, and in various places are also setting up "discipline, bearing, appearance, and conduct supervision stations" at the main intersections, bus and railway stations, and

docks. However, because of the idea that the "wearing uniforms and caps is a minor matter," which has existed in the communist army for a long time, the widespread neglect of military discipline, compounded with the fact that basic-level cadres are restless in their posts and their management of the units is slack, from first to last it has been impossible to stop the serious situation in which discipline, bearing, and appearance are not in good order.

III. Unhealthy Trends in Military Discipline and Corruption Are Rampant

A. The Ways of Subjecting Others to Discipline Are Improper, and There Are Serious Cases of Beating, Cursing, and Inflicting Corporal Punishment

In the past the communist army, with regard to administrative management of its companies, time and again stressed the principle that education was primary and punishment was secondary. However, during "streamlining and reorganization," because the work tasks were heavy and fewer cadres were at their posts, in order to get work done as fast as possible there has widely appeared among company cadres a feeling of impatience and their methods of subjecting others to discipline have become simple and crude so that the situation of beating and cursing fighters has become very widespread. Because of errors in their thinking, many cadres think that "a slap produces a good soldier and beating and cursing establishes prestige." They do not regard beating and cursing fighters as a disgrace, but on the contrary regard them as an effective means of disciplining the troops. They say that beating, cursing, and inflicting corporal punishment on fighters are "strict management." They argue with themselves that "although being simple and crude, beating and cursing fighters is not good, they are always better than eating to satiety and not getting things done." With this "false reasoning," the problem of cadres' beating and cursing fighters is becoming more and more serious. For example:

1. In a certain company of the "Nanjing Military Region," many cases of squad leaders' beating and cursing fighters occurred recently, and one of the fighters who had been beaten even suffered injuries to his internal organs. Although the cadres of this company clearly knew of this, they were indifferent and did nothing about it. At roll call time, the company commander went so far as to say: "The squad leaders beat you to get you to work. It's no good to complain about being beaten, because I will dismiss your complaint." (Footnote 8) (16 May 1986, LAD p 1)

2. In a "certain recruit company" of the Air Force, during training the fighters were frequently punched and kicked. The faces of many fighters were black and blue and swollen. Many fighters went to the medical station to get painkilling ointments, and a woman doctor discovered what was going on. She made a criticism to the commander of this recruit company and the number of cases of beating fighters was reduced. (Footnote 9) (8 April 1986, KONGJUN BAO, p 3)

3. On a certain night, Guo Yuyi [6753 3768 0310], commander of a certain regiment, after taking some drinks, made a telephone call to the motor vehicle platoon to get a vehicle. The fighter who took the call, Li Zhongbo [2621 1813 3134], mistakenly thought it was another fighter playing a joke on him

and he paid no attention. In a fit of rage, Guo went to the motor vehicle platoon and beat up Li, inflicting injuries to his face and head. For this reason the Political Department and the Discipline Inspection Commission of the "Shenyang Military Region" recently issued a joint notice, dismissing Guo Yuyi from his post as regiment commander and his post as deputy secretary of the regiment's party committee. (Footnote 10) (7 March 1986, LAD p 1)

Currently in the companies of the communist army, because the cadres' means of subjecting others to discipline are improper, the line of demarcation between imposing strict demands and using simple and crude methods is not clear. There is no clear division between cherishing the troops and leading them. The situation caused by willfully beating and cursing the fighters has unprecedently worsened the relations between officers and men. From the stipulation in the communist army's original "eight points of attention" of "do not beat or curse people" to the stipulation in the recent "eight prohibitions" of "beating, cursing, and inflicting corporal punishment on fighters is prohibited," the degree of the seriousness of this situation can be seen.

B. The "Study of Connections" Is in Vogue, and the "Unhealthy Trend of Sending Presents" Is Rampant

In the recent period, the communist army has been influenced by the bad customs in society, and in the units there have widely appeared cases of entertaining guests and sending presents. Many fighters have either sent letters to JIEFANGJUN BAO or written letters to their families, complaining that if they don't give presents they can't get anything done. According to them, a fighter "formerly for visiting family, going to school, study skills, receiving awards for meritorious services, getting transferred to volunteer status, and joining the party, had to strictly go by regulations, and things were done according to rules; now he has to 'depend on tobacco and liquor to build a bridge and on special local products to pave the way.'" Therefore, many fighters, just after joining the army, write letters home wanting money, tobacco, and liquor to give as presents to the cadres. Some dependents of fighters who go to the units to visit their relatives must also raise money to lay out liquor and fete company cadres, so that the "unhealthy trend of giving presents" in which "good relationships are not as good as good things" is widely in vogue in the communist army.

To stop this unhealthy trend, JIEFANGJUN BAO on 21 February this year specially published a commentator's article entitled "Guard Against the Corrosion by Unhealthy Trends of Officer-Men Relations." It pointed out that the "unhealthy trend of giving presents" shows that the "principle of commodity exchange has intruded into officer-men relations in the companies. The cadres' prestige has been damaged, the fighter's spirits have been corrupted, and the armed forces' image has been damaged." It demanded that "a correct viewpoint on respect for cadres be established, wiping away the dirt covering officer-men relations." The "General Political Department" has time and again demanded that the leaders of units at all levels must not receive any gifts from enlisted men. However, the communist army now, under the influence of the common practices of "looking at money in everything" and "stressing material benefits everywhere," frequently handles this rule as a

mere matter of form, verbally engaging in vigorous self-criticism but in reality still "giving and receiving presents as before."

C. Cadres Wantonly Misappropriate Recruits' Benefits

Now, in the communist army, besides the "unhealthy trend of giving presents," which is in vogue and in which one party is willing to hit and the other is willing to be hit, there has appeared a one-way phenomenon in which the cadres wantonly misappropriate the recruits' benefits. As soon as the recruits enter camp they are exploited, causing them to be anxious, resentful, and indignant. On 22 February this year, an article in JIEFANGJUN BAO entitled "Strictly Forbid Misappropriation of Recruits' Benefits" pointed out:

1. In a recruit company of a certain unit in the "Guangzhou Military Region," when recruit training ended in January this year, there were 10 days of mess expenses and food coupons remaining. When they were redeemed some squad leaders took this opportunity to deduct some money as "hardship expenses," so that after the recruits were assigned to units they had to dig into their own pockets to make up the difference in paying for mess expenses and food coupons.
2. In a "certain unit of the 47th Group Army," the practice of cadres' and veterans' borrowing money and other things from recruits was rife. They were either slow in repaying the money or did not repay it at all. When some recruits were unwilling to lend money or other things, some veterans would threaten them with abusive language like "it won't be good for you in the future." Other veterans, when on home leave, begrudging wearing a new uniform, and they borrowed the recruits' uniforms to wear. After returning to their unit they gave the recruits the old uniforms, and some even failed to return the uniforms after having borrowed them for a long time.

At present, the cadres or the veterans in the communist army, with the idea of "if you have authority and don't use it it becomes invalid after a specified time, if you can't eat for nothing then don't eat, and if you can't get things for nothing then don't get them," use their authority to seek private gain and eat and take more than their share. The practice of misappropriating the fighters' benefits is extremely widespread. For this reason many recruits say: "The units turned out to be such a disappointment," and they declare, "Wait until I become a veteran; then I will also live off the recruits." (Footnote 11) (21 February 1986 LAD p 3) Thus a "vicious cycle" is formed, causing morale to drop lower and lower.

D. Punishing Without Authorization, Fining Fighters at Every Turn

When the communist army was "streamlined and reorganized," because there was much readjustment of company cadres, after the new establishment was completed more than half of the company cadres were young and had been on active service for only a short time. They lacked management experience, causing many new problems to appear in company management. The cadres do not understand management methods so they make rules by themselves, and the instances of their arbitrarily punishing fighters are increasing day by day. Many units indiscriminately apply the experience of the localities by using economic

measures to punish fighters who break the rules. In the course of the rectification of military discipline, this situation is especially prominent. For example:

1. A certain unit of the communist army once set 21 fines for those who violate discipline, bearing, and appearance, including "2 yuan for unbuttoning one's shirt to bare the chest, 2 yuan for having long fingernails, and 2 yuan for wearing a mixture of the winter and summer uniforms." (Footnote 12) (11 January 1986, LAD p 3)

2. When JIEFANGJUN BAO reporters were covering several units in the "Lanzhou Military Region," they discovered that on the walls of certain squads and platoons "local rules" had been put up. They were the "8 big bans" and the "10 prohibitions," such as "fighters are not permitted to ride bicycles," "fighters are not permitted to watch television on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday," and so forth. The "8th Company of a certain regiment" set rules for "a 0.5-yuan fine for not showing up at ordinary assemblies and for not attending drills, a 1-yuan fine for leaving camp without asking permission and for throwing things, and a 5-yuan fine for being discovered on the streets when discipline, bearing, and appearance were not in good order." (Footnote 13) (26 May 1986, LAD p 3)

In the communist army, the enlisted men are paid by the "supply system." Each month an enlisted man gets only about 12 yuan. With "economic punishment" now being in vogue and money being appropriated by fines at every turn, there is not much left. Thus there is widespread resentment among the enlisted men and a deepening of the contradiction between officers and men.

E. Excessive Drinking, Gambling, and Looking at Obscene Things Are Flourishing

In the recent period, because the communist army has been corrupted by the extravagant mood in society, the units have been affected by the factors during the "streamlining and consolidation" of chaos in personnel matters, lax management, cadres' not being content to serve, low morale, as well as a lack of civilized, healthy activities. The practices of excessive drinking, gambling, and looking at obscene things have spread into the units. Under their influence, not only is discipline in the units destroyed, officer-men unity impaired, and the reputation of the units damaged, but they have even caused criminal cases of stealing, robbing, graft, and rape. Representative examples are:

1. In the "Guangzhou Military Region," a certain Zhang [1728], a meceptionist in the relief office of a certain unit, in January of this year while celebrating his birthday drank to excess and died of alcohol poisoning. Three other enlisted men in this unit suffered alcohol poisoning, but are now out of danger after receiving emergency treatment. (Footnote 14) (31 January 1986, ZHANSI BAO, p 2)

2. Fighter Song Ming [1345 2494], of a certain naval unit stationed in Shanghai, stole public money because he had lost money gambling and was sentenced to imprisonment. In the "Xinjiang Military Region," it has become a

common practice for fighters to watch pornographic videotapes, and some even watch them until 4 o'clock the next morning, greatly affecting their work on that day. Some of the enlisted men do not get out of bed in the morning and do not attend drills. In some units, the rate of missing roll call is more than 90 percent. (Footnote 15) (16 July 1986, LAD p 1)

F. The Unhealthy Trend of Practicing Fraud Is Spreading Unchecked

The unhealthy trend of "practicing fraud" has always been a serious malpractice existing in the basic-level companies of the communist army. Recently, following the pushing forward of the work of "streamlining and reorganization," there has been a tendency for it to spread even further. In the newly formed leading groups of the communist army, many cadres are anxious to show off. They do not scruple to bully and oppress those under them and to deceive those above them, specially trying to get good marks by "fraud and deception." Specific examples are:

1. A certain group army of the "Shenyang Military Region" recently invested in the building of a prawn-breeding farm. Its annual output of prawns was only 5 tons, but, in writing a report for the newspapers, the army said the annual output was 40 tons with an output value of 1 million yuan. Accidents occurred in some units of this group army. Provided no one was killed, the accidents were not reported to the higher level. If someone was killed they would rather spend a little money to get the "official" accident changed to a "private" accident. At a "military region" sports meet, in order to get places during the competition the group army made use of local athletes who took part by assuming the names of others. Under the slogan of "adding to the prestige of the units" of this group army, it was full of the practice of fraud with the idea of getting fame and gain. (Footnote 16) (8 January 1986, LAD, p 1)
2. Also, for example, during the examination of individual basic training in the first half of this year, a certain artillery brigade of the "Jinan Military Region," in order to place well, pulled out six "crack squads" from various units and gave them "key training." As a result, in the examination these six "crack squads" got an overall appraisal of "excellent," but a third of the other fengui got an overall appraisal of "unqualified," thus arousing dissatisfaction and criticism among the cadres and fighters. (Footnote 17) (28 April 1986, LAD p 1)
3. In the period of the "streamlining and reorganization," there were even more cadres and enlisted men in the communist army who, in order to achieve their aim of getting individual transfers or of having their dependents accompany their units, either made use of work conveniences or went through irregular relationships to practice fraud with respect to their records of meritorious service, thereby abetting even more the unchecked spread of "fraudulent" practices in the communist army.

IV. Difficulties Encountered in Rectifying Discipline

A. Cadres Ignore Rules and Regulations

For a long time the cadres of the communist army have been influenced by "guerrilla bad habits," thinking that the "gun barrel" represents everything. Their idea of complying with rules and regulations has always been dim." There widely exists among them the idea that "provided laws are not broken, violations of discipline don't amount to anything." Since Deng Xiaoping retook military control, because of the need for building a modern armed forces, in October 1983 he reissued "Formation Drill Regulations," making them the basis for formation drill training and formation life in the communist army. In January 1984, he revised the "Discipline Regulations," making them the basis for upholding discipline and for rewarding and punishing. In September of the same year, the "Interior Service Regulations" were reissued, making them the basis for the communists army's management and education and for its an internal service system. However, after these "three large sets of regulations" were revised and separately issued, they were not taken seriously by the basic-level cadres in the communist army. They still relied on their experience in managing the units. When anything cropped up, they did not look to see what the regulations stipulated, but rather looked to see what the higher level was doing and demanding, so that many basic-level cadres in the communist army were unfamiliar with the content of the rules and regulations. For example, it was discovered that 42 company commanders of a certain division in the "Nanjing Military Region" in a "concentrated training class on management education teaching materials," when taking a pretraining test on regulations, did not understand the basic content of the "Interior Service Regulations" and "Discipline Regulations," and consequently none of them passed the test, their average score being only 54.8. (Footnote 18) (28 February, 1986, LAD p 1) Also, for example, when 19 cadres of a certain battalion in the "Guangzhou Military Region" recently took a test on the "Interior Service Regulations," 12 and 15 of them respectively could not answer the most simple questions, like "whether there should be no fewer than three evening roll calls per week" and "whether roll call should be taken on Sundays and holidays." (Footnote 19) (9 August 1986, Central People's Broadcasting Station) When a certain unit of the "General Staff Department" recently gave a test on common regulations to 54 of its company commanders and platoon leaders, more than a third of these cadres did not pass. (Footnote 20) (20 May 1986, LAD p 1) All of this is sufficient to show that the situation in which communist army cadres ignore rules and regulations is quite serious.

Besides the widespread indifference in the communist army to the study of the three large sets of regulations, the communist army's original "Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention" are now being widely ignored or forgotten in the basic-level companies. On 21 June this year, JIEFANGJUN BAO carried a "reader's letter" which pointed out that in the battalions in the communist army very few people had heard of the "Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention." The memory of this song has already faded from the minds of many people. In some companies, when there is an assembly and this song is sung, the singers stop halfway through it because they cannot remember the words. When He Qizong [0149 0366 1350], deputy chief of staff of the communist army, was recently interviewed by

JIEFANGJUN BAO reporters, he focused on the communist army cadres' indifference toward rules and regulations, and frankly pointed out: "Since the streamlining and reorganization, many problems exist in the implementation of regulations by various units. In the main they regard rules and regulations as formalism and do not enforce them conscientiously." (Footnote 21) (29 May 1986, LAD p 1) From this it can be seen that the cadres' ideas of observing discipline and abiding by the law has not yet changed. It will be extremely difficult for the communist army to rectify military discipline and achieve what is called a state in which "if there is a regulation it will certainly be abided by, and if there is a point of discipline it will certainly be observed."

B. The Serious Situation of the "Four Laxities"

After the guiding ideology for building the communist army changed to the so-called building in a period of peace, in company management there unavoidably appeared slackness, carelessness, and sloppiness. In this the situation of the "four laxities" is most serious. The so-called "four laxities" are:

1. "Laxity in ideology," which includes two psychological states. One is the effect of the change on the guiding ideology for building the army. Under the idea that "a big war will not break out for a time, and vigilance against war can be relaxed, so rules and regulations need not be conscientiously enforced," (Footnote 22) (16 June 1986, LAD p 1) the demands on the functions of the armed forces in the period of peace have been relaxed. "Laxity in ideology" is produced by the idea that "since a big war will not be fought, it doesn't matter if management is a little lax." The other state is the psychological effect of the idea that "being a soldier means taking a loss." It is thought that the armed forces are not a place to stay for a long time, and thus "the body is in the military camp, but the heart is in the locality." The cadres' every thought is on being transferred to civilian employment in the localities at an early date, producing a psychology of slackness and unwillingness in disciplinary work. When something crops up, they often, with the self-mocking attitude of "how much longer do I have anyway," relax demands, causing the spread of "laxity in ideology." The "laxity in ideology" produced by the above-mentioned two psychological states is currently the most serious of the "four laxities" in the communist army, and is also the biggest problem facing the communist army in strengthening discipline.

2. "Laxity in systems," namely, in certain daily systems stipulated by rules and regulations in the communist army, there have appeared the phenomena of their not yet being able to be completed or falling short in enforcing them. This situation, since the beginning of this year, is seen in the continuing and detailed reports in JIEFANGJUN BAO on the communist army's basic level and organizations with respect to the systems of bedchecks and military officers staying in camp, as well as the duty systems. The reports fully reveal the current relaxed situation in the communist army with respect to the enforcement of rules and regulations. For example, the "Interior Service Regulations" stipulate that "after taps is sounded everyone must go to bed and silence must be maintained." From 8 to 13 May this year, when JIEFANGJUN BAO reported on-the-spot observations of how this rule was being reinforced in 10 companies of a certain Air Force unit, they discovered that "in the corridors

there were shadows of people moving about, in the washrooms there was the sound of running water, in front of television sets there were many viewers, and in the living quarters there were very few sleepers." (Footnote 23) (22 May 1986, LAD p 1) This rule was not at all conscientiously implemented. Also, for example, at the beginning of May this year, when JIEFANGJUN BAO reporters were inspecting the basic-level duty systems in five companies, they discovered that in the vehicle and gun park of the 3d Company of a certain antiaircraft gun regiment of the "Nanjing Military Region" there was no one on duty guarding it. (Footnote 24) (5 May 1986, LAD p 1) In a certain unit of the "Shenyang Military Region," it was discovered that on-duty personnel had, without authorization, left their posts to watch a film. (Footnote 25) (8 May 1986, LAD p 1) In the enforcement of the bedcheck system, it was discovered that the cadres were not doing their duty, and "replacements" were found that the enlisted men had substituted for the check. (Footnote 26) (6 January 1986, LAD, p 1) With regard to the enforcement of the system of military officers' staying in camp, it was discovered that in a certain regiment of the "Jinan Military Region" the enforcement was not strict and no inspections were made, so that some cadres returned home every day to eat and stay and no one questioned this practice. There are very many cases of returning home earlier than scheduled, delaying the return to camp, as well as going home without asking for leave. The director of this regiment's political department turned a blind eye to these cases, and even said: "Some of the cadres are old, and we cannot make excessive demands on them." (Footnote 27) (23 May 1986, LAD p 1)

3. "Laxity in management," namely, there have appeared in the communist army organizations' dealings with the units and the cadres' dealings with fighters cases in which what should be managed is not managed, what should be said is not said, and even the bad phenomenon of laissez-faire. The seriousness of the effect of this situation can be seen from two cases recently exposed by JIEFANGJUN BAO:

First, a report in the 15 February JIEFANGJUN BAO, an "investigative report" entitled "The Destruction of the Barracks of an Artillery Regiment Should Not Become a Pattern," pointed out that a certain artillery regiment in the "Shenyang Military Region," during the "streamlining and reorganization" when units were deactivated, under the circumstances of "laxity in management," the barracks were looted and their furnishings sold off or destroyed. When the inhabitants in the vicinity saw that the barracks area of this regiment was in such a state of chaos, they took the opportunity to go into the barracks area and grab and loot right and left, or to buy cheap goods, making this barracks area seem like a temple fair. Vehicles and people came and went, and the barracks area bustled with noise and excitement. Within 1 month, the destruction had become a pattern. Two-thirds of the buildings had no doors, windows, or glass. The tiles on roofs were stripped bare. No paving bricks could be seen on the ground. The lamp posts on the two sides of the entrance gate were broken to pieces. What had taken many years to build was destroyed in a very short time.

Second, in a "reader's letter" revealed by the JIEFANGJUN BAO of 10 May this year entitled "For 3 Months a Fighter Had No 'Home' to Return to," it was pointed out that fighter Zhang Maochi [1728 5399 3069] of the field artillery brigade of a certain group army in the "Jinan Military Region" originally

served in the signal company of his brigade. This year, during the "streamlining and reorganization," he was transferred to the brigade's guesthouse. Later, because of sickness he requested leave. The guesthouse took this opportunity to kick him back to his original unit. However, when he returned to the signal company and reported for duty, for the reason that they "had not received a notice from the higher level and a transfer order from the military affairs section," the company's cadres refused to accept him. When he went back to the guesthouse, it refused to receive him on the grounds that "you have been transferred to the signal company, and we can do nothing about it." For 3 months this fighter had no "home" he could return to. Finally, he appealed to JIEFANGJUN BAO and the matter was resolved.

From the above-mentioned two cases, the serious degree of the "laxity of management" of personnel and materiel currently in the communist army can be seen.

4. "Laxity in discipline," namely, under circumstances in which the communist army systems are not implemented and management is not strict, there has been widely produced a dim concept of discipline and a lax ideological style. There is laxity in that the iron discipline in the mind is not that "iron." This situation can be seen by the fact that currently among the communist army's cadres, when enforcing discipline and meting out punishment, the measures of "floating punishments" and "probationary punishments" are in vogue. For example, in a certain unit in the "Lanzhou Military Region," "floating punishments" are in vogue. Without permission, the cadres put the authority to punish in their own hands. Once a fighter commits an offense, they bring a charge against him. When the fighter "comes clean," they announce that the charge is dismissed. This kind of "floating punishment" is not reported to the higher level for the record, and also is not put in the fighter's files. Recently, "probationary period punishment" has been in vogue in a certain regiment of the "Nanjing Military Region." When a fighter violates discipline, it is announced that he is being given "probationary period punishment" with a buffer of a 3-month "probationary period." At its expiration, if the fighter has not corrected his mistake, the punishment is changed to formal punishment. (Footnote 28) (12 May 1986, LAD p 1) In addition, in the communist army there has recently appeared the intercession practice of calling for "rescinding punishments." During the "streamlining and reorganization," some personnel wanting to be demobilized had requested that the punishments they received in the army be deleted from their files, so that when demobilized and transferred to civilian employment it would be easier for them to get jobs. These situations seriously violate the provisions of the communist army's "discipline regulations," causing the regulations to lose their enforcing nature and become trifling matters. However, the above-mentioned situations occur widely in various units of the communist army, showing that the situation with respect to "laxity in discipline" is extremely serious and creates a big, perplexing problem for the strengthening of discipline.

C. The "Theory That Being a Soldier Means Taking a Loss" Intensifies the Undermining of Discipline

In recent years, the idea that "being a soldier means taking a loss" has become a prominent ideological problem that is extremely prevalent in the communist army's units. Certain cadres think that the position of military men is not high now and that people look down on them, so they "take a loss politically." On joining the army, recruits think that the economic remuneration for military men is now not as high as that in the localities and that their families cannot get preferential treatment, so they "take a loss economically." This psychology of "being a soldier means taking a loss" is being spread more and more widely following the deep-going development of the communist army's "streamlining and reorganization," causing the situation of not being content to be active duty to become more serious day by day. To achieve their aim of being demobilized, being transferred to civilian employment, and leaving the units early, some people do not even hesitate to test the "law" in order to create conditions for themselves to "leave." For example, the political instructor of the antiaircraft artillery battalion of a certain division in the "Jinan Military Region," during the "streamlining and reorganization" last year, when his request to the leaders for transfer to civilian employment was turned down, thought, "If I behave well I won't be able to leave, but if I behave badly I'll be able to leave quickly." Without cause he overstayed his leave by 37 days, and received the punishment of being recorded as having committed a serious offense. (Footnote 29) (12 August 1986, LAD, p 2) In addition, some people in the communist army, under the influence of the idea that "being a soldier means taking a loss," get the idea that "what is lost outside the dike can be made up behind the dike." Thus they begin to engage in graft and embezzlement, misappropriating state assets. For example, Zhong Qingxin [6988 1987 2450], secretary and concurrently cashier of the management section of a certain unit in the "Guangzhou Military Region," under the influence of this psychology, on the one hand, racked his brains for ways to embezzle public funds, and, on the other hand, on the pretext that he had quarreled with a leader, requested transfer to civilian employment. In the end, because he embezzled 15,000 yuan in RMB of company funds he was given a prison sentence. (Footnote 30) (5 January 1986, LAD p 1) The cadres and enlisted men of the communist army are now influenced by this psychology of "being a soldier means taking a loss," and the undermining of discipline that it causes is extremely widespread, seriously affecting the work of rectifying military discipline.

V. Conclusion

The problem of the undermining of discipline in the communist army is longstanding. During the "Cultural Revolution," because the communist army was influenced by propaganda such as "kick over the party committee and make revolution" and "to rebel is justified, with the views that "observing discipline is slavishness," there was a slackness in discipline and a dim idea of observing law and discipline, so that breaking the law and disobeying orders, stealing, embezzling, seizing the enlisted men's benefits, and other cases of the undermining of military discipline increased day by day.

As early as 1975, Deng Xiaoping said, "The armed forces must be rectified." In 1981, after taking over as chairman of the "Military Commission," with the army-building line of "modernization" and "regularization," he tried to change the "guerrilla bad habits" of the communist army. Over these years the communist army has taken the following measures to rectify military discipline: In 1981 it reinstated the "Military Man's Oath" and set forth the "Regulations for the Procedures of 1 Day's Life"; in 1983 and 1984, it reinstated the "Formation Regulations," "Discipline Regulations," and "Interior Service Regulations"; and since the beginning of this year it has spared no pains to strengthen military discipline. However, because of the very big change that has occurred in the component members of the communist army, it does not have the "purity" of the "rural soldiers" of the past. Following the addition of many "city and town soldiers," the understanding of things by the communist army's officers and men has improved, and in everything they have their own views. Their spiritual and material demands are also great, but with the dry-as-dust military camp life, no matter whether material or spiritual, it is impossible to satisfy their demands. In addition, with the infection of the common practice of "looking at money in everything" derived from putting into practice the policy of opening to the outside, individualism has reared its head, causing the rectification of the military discipline in the communist army not only to be difficult to effect, but to even tend to worsen discipline, and reach the serious plight of "orders not being carried out and prohibitions not stopping practices." Especially during the "streamlining and reorganization" carried out by the communist army, there has appeared the crisis of the "four laxities" with respect to subjecting others to discipline, even more making the rectification of military discipline a case of "wanting to brace up but lacking the strength to do so." This will be the problem that will be the hardest for the Chinese communists to overcome.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

PRINCIPLES OF PLA CONSTRUCTION, RESTRUCTURING

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[Article by Yu Yu-lin [0358 7183 7207]: "Deng Xiaoping's Army-Building Line"]

[Text] Basically, the background to the emergence of Deng Xiaoping's army-building line is that it is the result of the revision and development of Mao Zedong's line in a different time and space. Thus, compared with Mao Zedong's army-building line, Deng Xiaoping's line embodies the continuation and evolution of Mao's line. Its starting point is the theory of people's war under the conditions of modern warfare, that is, it recognizes that S&T developments and progress in weapons unavoidably engender a revisionary effect on Mao Zedong's theory of people's war. Thus, the army-building work in the "people's armed forces" also needs revision, and it cannot copy indiscriminately Mao Zedong's army-building principles. (Footnote 1) (See "Chairman Mao on People's War," HONGQI [RED FLAG] No 12, 1967 (1 August 1967), pages 2-16; and Lin Biao's "Long Live the Victory of People's War," HONGQI, No 12, 1967, pages 17-47.) The biggest difference between the two army-building lines of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping is that Mao Zedong regarded army-building work as purely political work, and naturally he regarded the armed forces (the gun barrel) as playing an indispensable role in political struggle. This is not the case with Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping regards army-building work as one body with two sides--military work and political work--and that neither should be emphasized at the expense of the other, but that the final aim of political work is to insure the smooth carrying out of military work. Therefore, he paid particular attention to the armed forces' unique nature in national defense. Although he did not lose sight of the important role of the armed forces in political struggle, Deng Xiaoping hoped that this would only be a role of a temporary nature in a transitional period. At the beginning of the eighties, he carried out a comprehensive restructuring of the military system. He set up an integrated system of military colleges and schools, various rules and regulations, and regulations for the active service of military officers. He set up the People's Armed Police to take over the security functions of the communist army. He put the people's armed forces departments into the local system of organization. He promoted the army-building principles of regularization and modernization. He set up the policy of making cadres younger in average age, professionally more competent, and better educated. All this proved that Deng Xiaoping was changing the

communist army from the "people's revolutionary armed forces" in the model of Mao Zedong's army-building line to professional revolutionary armed forces that possess some characteristics of Western armed forces. The army's distinctive features are "nonfactional," "doing away with factions," putting specialization in command," and "making politics fresh." (Footnote 2) (Deng Xiaoping's army-building line has some points of similarity with Peng Dehuai's [17756 1795 2037] army-building position. However, Deng Xiaoping's background is that of a political commissar, and he still attaches considerable importance to political work in the armed forces. Peng Dehuai emphasized the special nature of military work. He deliberately separated the political commissar and military systems to let the military take charge of the military. Therefore, Peng's position was comparatively close to the army-building patterns of the Soviet Red Army. Deng Xiaoping was little influenced by the Soviet Red Army's principles of army building. There are two reasons for this difference: First, in the fifties, Chinese-Soviet military cooperation played an important role, and the Soviet army-building principles were fairly familiar. Also, after the Korean War, Deng had his own views on the question of armed forces command, and he made party work primary, attaching comparative importance to the party's control of the army. Second, Peng was a professional military man, and he laid particular stress on military specialized work. By habit, Deng put particular stress on looking at military questions from the focus of politics.) The army-building goal in what the Chinese communists call the Deng Xiaoping era is to establish modernized, regularized armed forces with distinctive Chinese features.

The Communist Army's Principle of "Doing Away With Factions"

Speaking factually, the principle of "doing away with factions" can only be counted as one of the long-range objectives that Deng wants to achieve. In the present stage, Deng Xiaoping still regards the communist army as the pillar for the reform faction's political power, and this spirit of "doing away with factions" only runs through Deng Xiaoping's thinking on army building. In general terms, it is the army-building principle of regularization to make the armed forces become armed forces under the dual leadership of the party and state. The army will no longer get involved in intraparty struggles. Even if an intraparty struggle breaks out, the communist army should, out of habit, stay aloof and not be keen on taking part, as it was in the past. However, what must be pointed out is that there is a very big difference between the principle of "doing away with factions" and the principle of "political neutrality." "Political neutrality" means that the armed forces would keep far away from politics or would not get involved in political affairs and would only concentrate on national defense work. The principle of "doing away with factions" means that the communist army would no longer combine factions and politics, but would still need to be concerned about politics or the direction of the development of socialism. Once someone tries to make social and political developments diverge from the path of socialism, the communist army still has the right and responsibility to make vigorous efforts to turn the tide. However, Deng faces a very big problem in the contradiction between how to make the communist army be concerned about politics but not interfere in politics. To resolve this contradiction, Deng is sparing no pains in the work of pursuing the regularization of the communist army, so that there will be an objective

system of regulations for the armed forces to follow. The result of this systematization will certainly be to make the criterion for a military man's promotion no longer his political loyalty, but make his performance in his speciality the criterion. With Deng Xiaoping as chairman of the Military Commission, the various systems of regulations he planned to reestablish involved the cadre retirement system, which stipulates the age limit for cadres at all levels, and the setting up of a system for promoting cadres. (Footnote 3) (Because the "active service regulations for military officers," which stipulate the maximum age limit for military officers on active service, have not yet been promulgated, it is difficult to accurately find out the age limit for officers in the communist army. However, the military service law promulgated in 1985 can provide a reference: second lieutenant, 30; first lieutenant, 30; captain, 35; senior captain, 35; major, 40; lieutenant colonel, 45; colonel, 50; senior colonel, 50; major general, 55; and lieutenant general, 60.) It is stipulated that no one who has not been trained in a regular military college or school can become an officer or be promoted. The establishment of the state's "Military Commission" shows that the armed forces are owned by the state, but because it is restricted by the party leadership system, the "State Military Commission" in the real sense is only a nominal organization. (Footnote 4) (See Chang Hsin's [1728 9515] "Military Power in China's Constitution," MING PAO (Hong Kong), 1 July 1984; and Kuo Hua-lun's [6753 5478 0243] "Military Power and Political Power of the Chinese Communists," CHUNGKUO SHIHPAO (Taipei), 4th day of 2d month of the 72d year of the republic)

However, in carrying out the work of "doing away with factions" in the communist army, Deng puts most of his effort on perfecting the party's command system with regard to the army and on establishing a tradition of civilian leadership over military men. With regard to personnel affairs, unless it is a case of absolute necessity, military men will no longer take the principal leadership posts or policymaking posts in the party, like those of the CPC Central Committee's Politburo, Secretariat, and departments and commissions, and those of party and government leaders at all levels. Moreover, in the second half of 1979 Deng restored the system under which party committees at the provincial level and below have the right to exercise leadership over military units at the same level, stipulating that the first political commissars in the units of all levels are also the party committee secretaries at the same levels, in order to implement the party's leadership over the army. (Footnote 5) (Communist bandits' local broadcast, 5th day of 2d month of the 73d year of the republic, local forces one. (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense)) Naturally, the clear result of pushing military men out of the central leading groups is to lower the military man's right to speak and his influence on the central political stage and to reduce the military man's capability for political activity. The situation is the same on the local political stage. Military leaders have fewer opportunities to appear in the leading groups of provincial-level party committees. Without a doubt, this tendency will have a major promotional effect on establishing the leadership authority of civilians.

In addition, Deng Xiaoping pays a lot of attention to insuring that the political role of military men is lessened. Just as the term suggests, making the leading groups in the communist army younger in average age means having more young and sturdy men become the leaders of the communist army, and no longer, as in the past, having the majority of them be old men of 60 years and more. Deng once set forth the criteria for the posts of armed forces cadres: about 30 years old at regimental level, about 40 at division level, and about 50 at army level. (Footnote 6) ("Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping," p 342)

Of course, making the cadres younger in average age also has the objective of enhancing the armed forces' combat effectiveness and improving their physiques. It is more of a political attempt than anything else: First, educated in Mao Zedong's army-building line for several decades, the majority of the older cadres in the communist army tend to be conservative, so that the communist army has become the supreme headquarters for the Chinese communist conservative forces. Second, in the communist army the disposition toward talking about merit but promoting by seniority is quite serious, which is detrimental to civilian leadership over the military, and also detrimental to the rise of younger military cadres. Third, through the policy of making cadres in the communist army younger in average age, Deng Xiaoping can promote a large number of young and vigorous military men who will pledge loyalty to the political power of the reform faction and to the support of the reform faction's policies. Finally, the majority of the older cadres in the communist army are so-called "meritorious persons who founded the state." They have great power and influence, they are stubborn and intractable, and they are a great obstruction to the establishment of political systemization.

In concert with the work of making the communist army cadres younger in average age, Deng, with a system, has insured the demand he made as early as 1980, namely, that to be promoted to cadre one must have been trained in a military college or school. He has set up three-level command colleges and schools--higher, middle, and primary--forming them into a three-level training system. The restoration of the system of military ranks and the idea of the system of planned rotational transfer of cadres in turns are also among Deng Xiaoping's important plans for effecting the regularization of the communist army. Article 9 of the "Military Service Law," which went into effect 1 October 1984, particularly stipulated "the putting into effect of the system of military ranks in the Chinese People's Liberation Army." However, because it encountered the impediments of subjective and objective circumstances, up to now the system of military ranks has not been restored. (Footnote 7) (It was once rumored within the CPC that the system of military ranks would be restored on 1 August 1985, but this has not yet been done. See TA KUNG PAO (Hong Kong) of 17 February 1985)

The system of rotational transfers is another measure that could weaken the high degree of factionalism in the communist army. Its main effect is to no longer confine military leaders to a fixed environment, in which an interlocking network of murky human relationships was formed, and then proceeding to the next step of forming a military mountain stronghold that became the political power base for an individual. However, up to now, in the process of the regularization of the communist army, Deng has not been able to

regularize the rotational training system. The reason is that up to now the Chinese communist leaders have been unwilling to carry out a large-scale rectification movement in the armed forces. In order to maintain unity and harmony in the armed forces, they can use the military factions to effect a balance of control. Moreover, by reducing the striking range of political leaders in the armed forces, the support or loyalty of military men can be obtained. Therefore, provided the political position for the armed forces is made clear, the military leaders will no longer publicly obstruct it, and most of them will be able to remain in their posts.

However, for Deng, "doing away with factionalism" in the communist army to a certain degree is only relative. As far as factionalism goes, he is cultivating a power-holding faction in the armed forces that is loyal to him, and for this reason he must weaken the old military factions of the past. On the one hand, he has begun to use people without factional coloring, so that the new generation of military men will avoid being drawn into factional disputes and will become warriors who make specialties primary and who are not keen on politics.

In addition, another important job of Deng Xiaoping's in regularizing the communist army is to nationalize the armed forces. However, under the premise of the contradictions between party leadership and the armed forces belonging to the people, it is not clear how Deng will compromise in handling this contradiction, which continues to exist. However, what is clear is that Deng's nationalization of the armed forces is still in the conceptual stage. On the one hand, he hopes to change the appearance of the party and the army in an effort to make a favorable impression on the outside world; on the other hand, by the use of education, he hopes that military leaders will no longer consider the armed forces their individual private instrument but rather the "nation's" public instrument. As for what success Deng will have, and whether the military leaders will have the viewpoint that the armed forces are owned by all the people, it is too early to say. At the most, Deng's only success is that he set up the State Central Military Commission, which exercises nominal leadership over the communist army.

The Principle of Cadre Specialization

Summing up what has been said, the greatest difference between the army-building lines of Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong is that Mao Zedong looked at army-building questions from a political viewpoint; Deng Xiaoping looks at army-building questions from the twin viewpoints of military affairs and politics, and he attaches special importance to steps for modernizing the armed forces. Deng Xiaoping believes that, no matter whether it is peacetime or wartime, the principal objective of the armed forces is to fight a war, and therefore their national defense function should be stressed more than any other function. In 1975, Deng Xiaoping said that the armed forces must be rectified, and one of the important aims of this was to prepare to fight a war. Of course, Deng Xiaoping has never underestimated the necessity of political work. Deng Xiaoping has divided the time for specialized training in military schools into two types: military schools, 70 percent military and 30 percent political; political schools, 60 percent political and 40 percent military. (Footnote 8) ("Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping," p 61) The

general tendency is to enhance training in military specialities. Therefore, even if Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese communist military leaders do not deny that the human element is still in first place, their view tends to be highly different from those of Mao Zedong and Lin Biao. They have made a comprehensive analysis of the human element, concluding that it not only includes the bravery, understanding, and spirit of sacrifice that Mao Zedong stressed. What is more important is that man's intelligence and ability cannot be overlooked, including man's mastery and application of science, culture, and technology. If we pass judgment on Mao Zedong's army-building viewpoint, it is that he abhorred the "purely military viewpoint." The origin of this difference is that Mao Zedong's army-building thought was the product of the conditions under which traditional equipment was used by the enemy and us in the revolutionary period, and the armed forces laid particular stress on using spiritual strength to make up for the obsolescence and backwardness of their own equipment. However, Deng Xiaoping's army-building thought is the product of the new period of development in national defense science and technology. The hard and sharp military science and technology more and more influences the outcome of wars. Yang Shangkun [2799 1424 2492] has admitted: "Now people more and more understand that the trial of strength between forces in a war is not only manifested in the number of troops; what is more important is that it is manifested in the modernization of weapons and equipment and in man's ability to control modernized equipment." (Footnote 9) (Yang Shangkun, "Build Powerful Revolutionary and Modernized Armed Forces--Commemorating the 55th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army," HONGQI, No 15 of 1982, p 8)

However, by no means can we lose sight of the fact that even if Deng Xiaoping stresses modern weapons, this does not weaken his demand for extremely effective political work in the armed forces. Deng still deeply believes in the traditional Mao-style viewpoint that political work is the lifeblood of the communist army. The basic difference between Deng and Mao in political work is that Mao Zedong had a predilection for a fanatical style of political work, and Deng Xiaoping demands that political work in the armed forces be a kind of political and ideological education that seeks truth from facts. Of course, the content of the education is also quite different. Deng's political work in the military is for the purpose of inculcating the armed forces in Deng's concrete ideological line. Mao Zedong's political and ideological education for the armed forces was a radical Utopian ideology and a feudal consciousness that preached the worship of the individual.

Therefore, in the development of political work in the communist army, there is a common tendency, namely, that political work in the armed forces is indispensable. However, there has been a very great difference in what ideology the communist army was inculcated with in different periods. The clearest example of this was the period when Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping were fighting for power. Hua stressed inculcating the communist army with the "whatever ideology" to "foster proletarian ideology and eliminate bourgeois ideology." (Footnote 10) (Hua Guofeng, speech at the All-Army Political Work Conference," HONGQI, No 7 of 1978, pp 17-22) Deng wanted the communist army to study Mao Zedong's principle of seeking truth from facts. With the renovation of the content of political and ideological education following the practical ideology of integrating theory with reality, the political work in

the communist army is different than in the past. Deng has synthesized political work and vocational work, and he does not limit political work to education in Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. There are two things that are most prominent: one is training dual-purpose talents for the army and the localities; the other is the movement for army-people joint building of spiritual civilization. These two things are Deng Xiaoping's new ideas and development of Mao Zedong's principle of making the communist army multifunctional.

In fact, training "dual-purpose talents for the army and the localities" is an extremely prominent part of Deng Xiaoping's army-building line. It is a restructuring of the relationship between the armed forces and the people. In the Mao Zedong era, the pattern he used was only to lay particular stress on the spiritual link between the army and the people. Naturally, there were also regular assistance in production and social service as well as irregular famine and disaster relief. However, from first to last Mao was disinclined to build the armed forces into a specialized domain that possessed modernized knowledge. Mao said again and again that the armed forces were a big school, but they were only a big camp for obscurantist education and were not a place for the enrichment of knowledge. Deng Xiaoping is different. He wants to make military men one of the important forces for promoting economic development in the backward national economy. Therefore, in contrast to Mao, Deng Xiaoping has raised the level of the armed forces' role as a production force. From the original manual labor, it has become a production force that participates in technology. Its promotion of economic modernization cannot be ignored. Even more important, military men are no longer limited to participating in political management work, but widely appear in specialized situations, effecting an essential change in the military-civilian relationship. In the past, as controllers of politics and ideology, military men who had been transferred to civilian employment and the ordinary populace were basically in an antagonistic state. Subsequently, once military men had joined in the production activities of enterprises, a military man who had been transferred to civilian employment became one of the common workers, a development that reduced the masses' psychology of excluding them and increased the state of harmony between military and civilian. (Footnote 11) (Yu Qiuli [0151 4428 6849], "Speech at the All-Army Conference on Studying Scientific and Cultural Knowledge and on Exchanging Experience in Training Dual-Purpose Talents for the Army and the Localities," (17 May 1983), JIEFANGJUN BAO 19 May 1983)

Of course, it cannot be denied that a key part in the training of dual-purpose talents for the army and the localities is its military nature, and is also a question of the units' building themselves. Under the theory of people's war under modern conditions advocated by Deng, the modernization of the armed forces is an inevitable development, and to master modernized weapons and equipment, the cadres and fighters must understand more scientific and cultural knowledge. Although the military colleges and schools can take care of part of the problem of raising the cadres' level of scientific knowledge, under the circumstances in which the level of S&T knowledge and cultural knowledge is universally low throughout the army, slow action cannot save the critical situation. Therefore, the comprehensive training of dual-purpose talents for the army and the localities can partially make up for this

shortcoming, and the hope is that it will swiftly raise the units' qualifications and quality for conducting modern warfare. However, there is still a very big difference between the armed forces' training dual-purpose talents for the army and the localities and the "big school" that Mao Zedong had in mind. What Deng Xiaoping stresses is the study of culture, including S&T knowledge and specialized skills. Mao Zedong's armed forces were a big school in which politics and ideology were studied, and what he stressed were spiritual purity and physical labor. Therefore, except for the idea that the armed forces must be prepared to fight a war, in this aspect there are very few similarities between them.

The Principle of Weakening the Political Role of Military Men

However, the place where Deng Xiaoping has made the greatest revision of Mao Zedong's army-building line, or we may say the place where he completely deviates from it, is Deng's opposition to Mao's principle of building the army with leftist ideology. In fact, under Mao Zedong's principle for building the army politically, the armed forces became a place of strategic importance for the leftist ideology. "Give prominence to politics," "put politics in command," "three militaries and two supports," worship of the individual, and so forth were all the result of the leftist ideology. From first to last Deng Xiaoping has believed that the only way to set up new-type armed forces is to eliminate the deep-rooted leftist ideology.

Generally speaking, the concrete manifestations of the leftist ideology in the armed forces are of a comprehensive nature. Ever since Deng Xiaoping pursued a new line at the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee, some people have considered it "rightist" and a "deviation," and have censured the new line as running counter to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. In politics, some people are still used to taking class struggle as the key link, and they attribute the appearance of crimes in society to the result of losing this link. In economics, some people from first to last stand by the ideas of "large in size and collective in nature" in the system and the idea of egalitarianism in distribution, and thus they suspect that Deng's policy of opening to the outside world and invigorating the domestic economy deviates from the direction of socialism. In ideology and culture, some people still maintain the old habits and characteristics of despising knowledge and discriminating against intellectuals, and they say that the occurrence of the tendency toward bourgeois liberalization was caused by the implementation of the policy on intellectuals. (Footnote 12) (Li Desheng [1621 1795 3932], "Insisting on Seeking Truth From Facts Is the Key to Unifying Thinking in the Party." RENMIN RIBAO, 19 March 1983) Therefore, changing the ideological structure of the armed forces has become an important key to Deng Xiaoping's control of the "gun barrel." If we do not have a bad memory, we may recall that in the power struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, one extremely important reason for the consolidation of Mao Zedong's leadership power was that he firmly controlled the military men in the ideological domain. If we make a comparison with the military dictators in the East Asia region, we can discover that the main reason that South Korea's Pak Chong-Hee was killed and that the Philippines' Marcos fell from power was that, although they carried the "gun barrel" for a long time, they were unable to firmly grasp it. The biggest difference between them and Mao is that what Mao did was to take

measures in the two aspects of party organization and ideological control to insure that the "gun barrel" was absolutely loyal to him as an individual. In this, the ideological control made military men fear Mao's authority, and they did not dare to create even a little disturbance.

Basically, there are two sides to Deng's rectification of the leftist ideology in the communist army: simply speaking they are the "destructive" and "constructive" sides. In this, the strongest focus of the "destructive" side is the eradication of the idea in the communist army of "better left than right." On the "constructive" side, there is the vigorous advocacy of the ideological principle of "seeking truth from facts." The greatest harm of the leftist ideology being deep-rooted in the military is that it obstructs Deng Xiaoping's overall control of the communist army, and hinders the development of reform policies as well as the long-term stability of the reform faction's political power. However, in Deng's attempt to eliminate the leftist ideology in the military there are many-sided specific characteristics, including:

First, the leftist ideology is a longstanding ideological tendency in the military which adversely affects the new army-building policy. From the end of the fifties up to now--for more than 20 years--Chinese communists have been in a leftist environment. About half the number of CPC members joined the party in the ultraleft period of the Cultural Revolution. Most of the other party members lived in a leftist environment and were deeply influenced by the leftist ideology. The armed forces were no exception. Deng has clearly pointed out: "We cannot ignore the mistaken ideology of the left; its roots are very deep." (Footnote 13) ("Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping," p 334) In fact the harm created by the leftist ideology in the military was quite far-reaching. For example, the serious consequences of the "antidogmatism" struggle in 1958 greatly harmed the building of the communist army. In 1959, the launching of the "antirightist" struggle, and the mass criticism of the so-called "purely military viewpoint" and the "bourgeois military line," also brought the building of the communist army to a standstill. In the early sixties Lin Biao took charge of the Military Commission's work. He began to advocate "giving prominence to politics" and "politics can change everything" and to criticize the mass troop-training movement, which even more seriously damaged the results of regularization and modernization in the communist army. It goes without saying that in the Cultural Revolution period there was an even greater upsurge of the leftist military ideology. The armed forces almost stopped military studies and military training. The armed forces' colleges and schools closed down, and large numbers of military books were burned. Therefore, armed forces building was in a state of stagnation. (Footnote 14) (Yang Yong [2799 0516], "Attention Must Be Paid to Eliminating the Influence of Leftist Ideology in the Military Domain," JIEFANGJUN BAO, 21 January 1983)

Second, individual military men are accustomed to looking at questions from the viewpoint of the left, and thus they oppose the reform policies. In May 1985, when making a speech to the military leading cadres of the Shenyang Military Region, Hu Yaobang clearly demanded that "through party consolidation, we truly overcome subjectivism in our ideology, and the vestiges and sentiments of the left in policy. This is the first difficulty

to resolve and the first thing to do. Party consolidation in the armed forces, generally speaking, marches at the head of the column. I hope you will set an example and play a role in helping the localities to overcome the influence of the left and overcome unhealthy tendencies." (Footnote 15) (RENMIN RIBAO, 20 May 1985)

Third, the greatest influence that the leftist ideology has had on the communist army is that military men, educated in the leftist line for a long time, got the impression that the communist army was Mao Zedong's own army and played the role of the pillar of dictatorship of the proletariat. This facilitated in the communist army the habit of taking part in political trends, and at every turn trying with force to obstruct the party's political trends and the direction of social development. For example, when Deng wanted to revise Mao's theory on people's war, the communist army rallied in opposition, and when Deng wanted to appraise Mao, the communist army rallied in opposition. When Deng wanted to make the economy the dominant factor in state construction so that military construction would come after economic construction, the communist army also objected. For this reason, Deng Xiaoping put forth the idea that the armed forces must subordinate themselves to the overall situation in state construction, an attempt to stifle the communist army's interference in many policy decisions made by the central authorities. (Footnote 16) (Yang Dezhi [2799 1779 1807], "The Strategic Decision To Strengthen Our Army's Construction in the New Period," HONGQI, No 15 of 1985 (1 August 1985), pp 3-7; RENMIN RIBAO, 2 November 1984, 4 November 1984, and editorial, "Be Subordinate to the Overall Situation and Put Forth Effort for State Construction," 5 November 1984)

In addition, Deng Xiaoping began a comprehensive negation of the Cultural Revolution and the "three supports and two militaries" movement, in an attempt to remove at one stroke the theoretical basis for the communist army to involve itself in politics on a wide scale. As everybody knows, the Cultural Revolution was the starting point for the communist army's involvement in politics. It gave military men the policy basis for exercising direct rule, which in the days to come it exercised more and more strongly, so that military men became the main force in political rule. Deng's negation of the Cultural Revolution and the "three supports and two militaries" was equivalent to the negation of the communist army leftist forces' self-styled "revolutionary tradition." It made them lose their "spiritual arm" for resisting the reform of the armed forces system and for getting excessively involved in politics, and forced them to accept Deng Xiaoping's new policy on army building.

In brief, in Deng Xiaoping's army-building policy, the anti-leftist movement is one of his important principles for building the army, and it is the work that faces the most twists and turns. As for what its effect will be, that is fairly hard to estimate. In the final analysis, an ideological problem is different from an organizational problem or a political problem. It is a problem that force cannot reverse, even less so in that, being cultivated in a leftist environment for a long time, the leftist ideology has rich soil for growth and maturation. Even more serious is that the Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, which Deng Xiaoping has always upheld, has latent leftist properties, and have become the basic pattern for the thinking style of the

communist party. (Footnote 17) (Yu Yu-lin, "Ideology and Chinese Communist Politics--On the Origin and Essence of the Differences in the Current Line of the Chinese Communists," CHUNGKUO TALU YENCHIU [MAINLAND CHINA STUDIES] monthly, vol 28, No 11 (6th month of the 75th year of the republic), pp 18-28) The communist army is the object that has received the most thorough inculcation in this leftist ideology. It only takes a little thought to see that this problem is complex and the correction of it will be difficult.

Rationalization of the Military Men's Role as a Work Force

The outside world often finds it very difficult to understand why it is that the Chinese communists, who have a tight system of control with the party, the League (Communist Youth League), and many social organizations, do not use these social and political organizations alone to do education work in society, but rather need to rely upon to a great degree on the advanced models and examples in the communist army, like Lei Feng and Wang Jie in the sixties and Zhang Hua and Zhu Boru in the eighties, to do educational work for the entire society.

Here, we can make observations on two levels. First of all, the communist army is a member of both the political and social worlds. It certainly does not put itself outside political affairs and society. Also, under the policy of the central authorities, the armed forces are the most organized and disciplined unit of society, and also the unit which has the most systematic ideological inculcation. The communist army's political departments, from the center (the General Political Department) to the military units at all levels, are staffed with political cadres, and they are engaged in specialized political education work of the armed forces. (Footnote 18) (political commissars at the division level and above, directors in the regiments, political instructors in the battalions, and political instructors in the companies.) This makes it, like the CPC and CYL, able to mobilize at any time to carry out comprehensive educational work for society. Moreover, its tight organization and discipline makes it convenient for expediting this educational work. Second, in history, the communist army succeeded in conquering China, causing military men to have a fairly high position in society. Also, the privileges and prestige in society enjoyed by military men makes them more persuasive. This is not the case with the CPC and CYL. During a long period of political turbulence, the CPC and CYL systems have taken a pounding several times. In the Cultural Revolution period, the ordinary youth and mass organizations could at will attack or destroy the CPC and CYL organizational systems, and could at will pull out and struggle against their own leaders. In another aspect, the CPC and CYL systems were in too close contact with society, making them comparatively exposed to examination by the masses, so that they were unable to maintain an image of being mysterious and almost perfect. Especially under the circumstances of being repressed, they made a fairly direct and fairly poor impression. Also, there is a fairly strong conflict of interests between the two sides, so that it is fairly difficult for the CPC and CYL to establish an exemplary image in society. This is not the case with the communist army. Its members live in military camps. Although at times they appear before the masses, they appear as helpers or rescuers (in disaster and famine relief). Also, under ordinary circumstances, the conflicts between military men and society are fairly

unclear and indirect. Of course, during the Cultural Revolution period, the military men's "three supports and two militaries" seriously damaged army-government, army-people relations. However, this was a special case. From the historical point of view the communist army's role in society as "protector" and "nurse" has not fundamentally changed. This impels military men to take an important role in the education of society.

Of course, the Chinese communists seized China's political organizations by military force. A blind faith in the omnipotence of the "gun barrel" lies hidden in the consciousness of all leaders, so that at all times a Chinese communist leader intends to use the armed forces to help him control the masses. Mao Zedong was the most typical representative figure. Deng Xiaoping is also like this, and he has not cast off Mao's pattern. Of course, between the two there is a certain difference in degree. For Mao Zedong, the communist army's role as a working force was an instrument for compulsory inculcation of ideology. For Deng Xiaoping, the communist army's role as a working force is one of ideological guidance. Thus, in the tactics used there is a very big difference. Mao put military men in charge of ideological studies, and with his status as a leader with a unified ideology; those who dissented were criticized and denounced at public meetings. This is not the case with Deng Xiaoping. He demands that military men be models and relate their own heroic deeds to the masses, setting a personal example and letting the masses spontaneously study, or coaching them to carry out ideological purification work. In Deng's "army-people joint building of spiritual civilization" movement, heroic models go on lecture tours and Zhu Boru is studied, actions which do not depart from this principle, namely, that the communist army's role as a working force tends toward rationalization.

"Army-people joint building of spiritual civilization" is the clearest manifestation of Deng's leadership, and is the real situation in the communist army's role as a working force. The appearance of the study of the model military man Zhu Boru clearly shows Deng's point of similarity with Mao in his demand for the military man's role. It can be determined that this function of the communist army in using military men to educate society, from beginning to end, has not slackened in the slightest. Therefore, the movement to study Zhu Boru precisely shows the following three facts:

1. Under Deng Xiaoping's army-building policy, military men still bear the role of a political work force, a role that cannot be ignored;
2. The role of the people's armed forces composed of military men who wholeheartedly serve the people is stressed; and
3. Military men are still the best objects for study by the entire society and the best embodiments of communist ideals.

Conclusion

Therefore, if we were to think that Deng Xiaoping's army-building policy is a complete negation or reaction to Mao Zedong's army-building line, we would be making a serious mistake in knowledge. At present, what is guiding the development of the Chinese communist armed forces is still certain basic

principles in Mao Zedong's army-building line of making them the people's armed forces and giving them many important roles. Deng Xiaoping has merely revised certain army-building principles of Mao Zedong, such as building the army with politics and excessive participation in policy, which caused bad effects. Speaking fairly to the point, Deng Xiaoping has made all actions of the communist army tend toward more rationalization, and has made the armed forces mainly a military force for combat and no longer a tool for political struggle. Therefore, Deng Xiaoping has carried on Mao Zedong's army-building line, and he has also revised it, making it more suited to the changing political and social, scientific and technological, and economic environments. However, Deng Xiaoping's army-building policy is not enough to cast off the CPC's system of organization and the standard basic role of military men in the CPC's army-building tradition, including the basic pattern in which the party and the army are not separated, the civil and the military are one body, and military men openly take part in politics.

Of course, judged from the viewpoint of long-range development, Deng's revision of Mao's army-building line is not without its peculiarities. After he came to power for the third time, in July 1977, he did his utmost to expedite regularization and modernization in army-building work, hoping to make it the norm for the armed forces to be under the long-term leadership of the party and to accept the absolute leadership of civilians over military men. He is also trying to reduce the military men's political role, strictly control and organize the armed forces, change the military men's ideological trend, and set up an integrated leadership system, so that the armed forces become the party's armed forces that only care about the direction of socialism and do not care about factional trends. As for how the coloring of "individualism" in the armed forces is to be eliminated, this coloring is precisely what Deng Xiaoping is striving to prevent. However, in this aspect--Deng's army-building principle of regularization--it can only be said that he has been half successful. Although he has initially achieved his demand for institutionalization, and has set up various kinds of rules and regulations, he has not had the power to establish the concept of respecting the institution. There are four reasons that caused this result: First, Deng Xiaoping's authority is insufficient. Compared to Mao Zedong, Deng is just one of the front army leaders; Mao was one of the founders of the Chinese communist army. This makes it very difficult for Deng Xiaoping to replace Mao Zedong's substantial image and ideological influence in the armed forces. Second, Deng Xiaoping's time in army building is still too short. Although there is no objective standard to illustrate this point, the time needed to set up new-type armed forces is long, and Deng has been in power less than 10 years, and thus it is very difficult for him to comprehensively assess the past 20 years of traditions in building the communist army. Third, too many of the military leaders are still products of the Mao Zedong era who were forcibly inculcated with his ideology, so that they are used to the old set of modes of thinking in the Mao Zedong standard, and they are not inclined to be completely in agreement with Deng's army-building spirit. Fourth, of course if Deng's army-building goals are achieved, the position and privileges in society of military men are bound to be weakened. This consequence makes the conservative elements in the communist army resist the complete implementation of Deng's army-building policy. In addition, another reason that cannot be overlooked is that military men are the mainstays of the dictatorship of the

proletariat and of the development of socialism. They are bound to be involved in the question in the party of the path taken by socialism. Conversely, any dispute in the party and any divergence in society is bound to be reflected in the armed forces, making it impossible for military men to be separated from political and social developments. This also, to a large degree, delays the adjustment of the military men's political role. Moreover, the turbulent political environment of the Chinese communists makes it unfavorable for the military men to stay aloof from affairs.

From this it can be seen that even if the goals of Deng Xiaoping's army-building work are quite clear, the spirit of history makes it very difficult for him to get instant results. The role of the Chinese communist military men is still, to a large degree, influenced by the organizational structure and the historical traditions.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

CIVILIAN-MILITARY INDUSTRIAL REFORMS INTERPRETED

HK121036 Beijing JINGJI GUANLI in Chinese No 1, 5 Jan 87, pp 34-37

[Article by Peng Jian (1756 1017): "Uniting Peactime and Wartime, and Uniting Civilian and Military Are Guiding Principles for the Coordinated Reform of Civilian and Military Industries"--edited by Liu Jichang (0491 0366 2490)]

[Text] I. Peacetime-Wartime Dislocation and Civilian-Military Confrontation

Uniting peacetime and wartime, and uniting civilian and military (shortened below to the two combinations) are the guidelines for the national defense industries announced anew by the central leadership after the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. The general interpretation of its implication is that the peacetime-wartime combination refers to national defense industries in peacetime performing a good job in arms production and at the same time actively conserving industrial war technology and production capacity to make the necessary preparations for wartime, while the civilian-military combination refers to war industry enterprises, under the precondition of ensuring fulfillment of war production tasks, rationally utilizing the conserved capacity (namely idle capacity) to open to product commodities for civilian use and to continuously transfer a large amount of the war industry's advanced technology to civilian uses. Regarding this, from top to bottom and from the war industry departments to departments producing commodities for civilian use, the understanding of the various parties is unanimous. This is also true in actual practice. However, if it is slightly analyzed, we may discover that in theory and in understanding imperfections may be found. First, if we say that if only the national defense industries must engage in the peacetime-wartime combination, then it implies a sole reliance on the war industry to cope with arms production and supply in wartime (meaning large-scale and total war, such as global war or when a country is confronted with a full-scale invasion by the enemy, while localized wars which do not affect the country's security as a whole are still considered as peacetime; the same interpretations apply below). In reality, this is basically not workable. There is no country in the world that can rely solely on the war industry to completely meet the demands for arms in actual warfare. In World War II, the United States depended on production from civilian enterprises for 95 percent of the supply of weapons and ammunition. The Soviet Union, only depending on 75 percent of all its civilian enterprises and on the mobilization of over 10 million workers to join the war production, could basically ensure meeting the needs of the front-lines. Next, if we say that only the national defense industries can carry out

the civilian-military combination then there is still a contradiction, because the civilian-military combination must carry the meaning of uniting the two sides, namely, war industry and civilian articles and transfers its technical knowhow to civilian use, this can only be said to be military-civilian transfer. In reality, it is only a single directional form of the "civilian-military combination." Hence, in either of the two combinations, it is necessary to include both the war industry and the civilian industry.

Seen from our country's actual practices in industry, due to the one-sides interpretation of the guideline of the two combinations, its enforcement has been confined to the national defense industries and for a prolonged period this has created the situation of "peacetime-wartime dislocation" and "civilian-military confrontation." In recent years, the problem could not only not be solved but also became all the more outstanding. First, in handling peacetime-wartime relationships, although our country has followed the patterns of the United States and the Soviet Union of setting up the three industrial levels in the defense industry, mobilized defense industry and the civilian industry, up to now we have not solved the problems of a rational ratio between the three levels and their organized liaison. On the other hand, the ratio between the defense industry and the mobilized defense industry has been dislocated, and a situation of a "big defense industry but a small mobilized defense industry" had developed. On the other hand, the defense industry and the civilian industry have each worked on their own, lacking an organized liaison between them. Under peacetime conditions, the defense industry's production capacity has largely been idle but is far from being sufficient to meet wartime needs. In other words, it does not have enough work in peacetime and is totally unable to cope with wartime needs. This is what may be called "peacetime-wartime dislocation." Second, in handling the relationship between the defense industry and the civilian industry, due to the belief that the civilian-military combination is strictly the defense industry's business, it is found that although the defense industry started the production of articles for civilian use, in general the civilian industry did not intervene at all. But when the defense industry's production of civilian articles reaches a stage with the civilian industry where there was fighting for raw materials and markets the latter started to intervene claiming that each should do its own thing and placed restrictions on the defense industry. When the defense industry would not yield and continued its development, the civilian industry's intervention became increasingly severe. This is the so-called "civilian-military confrontation."

Peacetime-wartime dislocation and civilian-military confrontation reflect one side of the outstanding problems existing in our country's industrial structure and management structure. On the one hand it is the fundamental cause for the current reform of the defense industry's structure and, on the other hand, it is one of the important topics requiring solution in the reform of industry's structure.

II. The Theoretical Concept of the Two Combinations As Guidelines for Coordinating the Reform of the Civilian and Military Industries based on the Peacetime-Wartime Replacement Law

In order to change the conditions of "peacetime-wartime dislocation" and "civilian-military confrontation" it is necessary to thoroughly implement the two

combinations' guidelines throughout the entire industrial sector and take it as one of the major guidelines for our country's industrial development. At present we should principally follow this guideline to carry out an overall coordinated reform of the national defense industry and the civilian industry and gradually realize rationalized industry, an advanced management structure, and the best economic benefits.

1) The law of peacetime and wartime replacing each other is the basic cause for the two combinations. Ever since mankind separated into different classes, war has become the highest form of class struggle and is in confrontation with peace. In a class society the two appear alternately, lasting throughout the beginning and end of a class society. Wartime and peacetime alternately replacing each other has become an important law in the development of human society. First, it has brought a new division of work in industry and made the arms industry specializing in arms production become gradually separated from industry and become an independent industry. Second, it requires man to be suited to the special features of peacetime-wartime replacement: during peacetime, industrial construction should have an eye on wartime needs; during wartime, industry should devote its efforts to support to win the war and to create a new environment for peace. Hence the peacetime-wartime combination must be enforced. Since peacetime industry and wartime industry are the sum total of the defense industry and the civilian industry, aside from differences in their ratios during peacetime and wartime, the two supplement each other, accompany each other's development, and continue like this from beginning to end in peace and in war. Hence, the military and civilian combination is an inevitable historical development.

From this it can easily be seen that to say simply that the peacetime-wartime combination refers to the national defense industry in peacetime storing up technology and production capacity for wartime and that the civilian-military combination refers to the national defense industry entering into civilian production and the transfer of technology to the civilian industries is obviously not comprehensive enough and cannot wholly reflect the contents of the nature of the two combinations. According to the law of peacetime-wartime replacement, the scientific definition of the two combinations should be generalized as: the peacetime-wartime combination refers to the innate organized liaison between peacetime industry (defense industry and civilian industry); the civilian-military combination refers to the innate organized liaison in peacetime and in wartime between the defense industry and the civilian industry. According to a further analysis of the law of peacetime-wartime replacement, dialectic relations also objectively exist between the two combinations. As we mentioned above, peacetime industry and wartime industry are the sum total of the defense industry and the civilian industry. Hence, the peacetime-wartime combination must take the civilian-military combination as its form of realization. Devoid of the civilian-military combination, the peacetime-wartime combination, and the purpose of the civilian-military combination is to realize the peacetime-wartime combination. This is the dialectic relationship between the two combinations.

2) Attending to both peacetime and wartime needs and readjusting the structure of the defense industry and the civilian industry. Following the deepening progress of the civilian industrial structure reform, the national defense

industrial structure reform has started to develop comprehensively. At present, one of the major tasks is to readjust the structure and transfer a large volume of the war production capacity to civilian use. If this refers merely to the relatively large amount of peacetime idle war industrial production capacity, then the method may perhaps still be workable. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the basic problem of our country's defense industry at present is that "in peacetime it does not run at full capacity while in wartime it can hardly meet wartime needs." The defense industry in ordinary times and in times of mobilization are out of proportion with each other and the defense industry and the civilian industry lack an innate liaison. Hence, we should not only care about peacetime and neglect wartime or care only about the present and not the future and transfer merely the defense industry's idle production capacity to civilian use. Rather, we should follow the law of peacetime-wartime replacement and in accordance with the demands of the two combinations guidelines coordinate the readjustment of the defense industry's structure along with the civilian industry. The target should be to form a new type of industrial system in which the defense industry and the civilian industry are separately responsible for their division of work and are in close liaison with each other. Regarding this, we propose the following two basic principles:

First, a small defense industry but a large mobilization. Under the condition that the existing civilian-military ratio temporarily remains unchanged, this refers to readjusting the ratio between the specialized defense industry and the mobilized defense industry. On the one hand, we should set up a specialized industrial structure which is of an appropriate scale, possesses superb equipment, integrates scientific research and production and principally shoulders, in ordinary times, arms research and renovation and the production tasks of key and specialized weapons and equipment. On the other hand, we should set up a mobilized defense industrial structure on a relatively larger scale and feature the civilian-military combination. In peacetime we should mobilize defense industry enterprises, concurrently with ensuring the fulfillment of a portion of the arms production tasks and storing the defense industry's production capacity for wartime purposes, greatly develop the production of civilian commodities and serve the state's economic construction. Once war erupts, the whole structure will be thrown into war production and in coordination with defense industrial enterprises the defense industry's specialized technology and personnel will be transferred to civilian enterprises to enable the whole country's economy to shift into wartime gear at the earliest moment.

Second, in ordinary times, a good foundation should be laid with the civilian industries as the main body. In wartime, the defense industry enterprises should act as the nucleus and be mobilized level by level. This refers to, on the basis of readjusting the ratio between the specialized defense industry and the mobilized defense industry, studying further the basis and development of the civilian industry. We should rationally determine the general ratio between the defense industry and the civilian industry and the ratios between the defense industry enterprises, the mobilized defense industry enterprises and the civilian industry enterprises and should, between the three categories of enterprises, set up an extensive and intimate lateral economic and technological liaison. In peace time, the three categories of enterprises will each exercise their separate functions: The defense industry enterprises attend to arms production, the civilian industry enterprises attend to production of civilian commodities while the mobilized defense industry enterprises attend to both arms production

of civilian commodities. All three of them will devote their full efforts to create a powerful material and technological foundation for the state. Once war erupts, first the defense industry, followed by the mobilized defense industry, and the civilian industry will, within the shortest time, complete the transition of the entire national economy to a wartime structure.

3) It is necessary to abide by the law of peacetime-wartime replacement and set up a new type of structure featuring the peacetime-wartime combination and the civilian-military combination. Our country is still in peacetime. Because the military confrontation between the two superpowers will not change greatly for a time, and added to it other factors such as the great role played by the world people's peace anti-war movements, for a certain period from now large-scale war is not likely to occur. This undoubtedly is a great and good opportunity for our country's modernization program, and we should devote all our efforts to it. However, the delayed eruption of war does not mean that it will never occur. In addition, the possibility of a sudden eruption of war still exists. Hence, in our reform of the industrial structure, we should take into consideration the role of the law of peacetime-wartime replacement and, in accordance with the guidelines of the two combinations, form a new type of industrial management structure which, on the one hand, in peacetime can effect a highly efficient control of both defense industry and civilian industry and accelerate economic construction, and on the other hand, is able in wartime to mobilize and organize the whole industry to enter into wartime production, render aid to the front, and achieve victory in the war. Such a structure should possess the following three basic and special features:

First, the departments of the defense and civilian industries, acting as management organs of industry and trade, must strengthen the channel of information, work in coordination with each other and form joint forces in management. This is determined by the organized liaison objectively existing in the two large industries of the defense industry and the civilian industry. In the past, due to an inflicted severance in the liaison between the two industries they have separately and independently developed and caused enormous losses. On the basis of the establishment of a new type of industrial structure, the management departments of the defense industry and of the civilian industry must strengthen their coordination, cooperation, serve each other, energetically push forward the defense industry and mobilize the later liaison between the defense industry and the civilian industry, particularly with reference to industry's war preparations (peacetime) and war mobilization (wartime) work. Management departments of the defense industry and of the civilian industry should more closely cooperate with each other and form joint forces in management. This is one of the major and special points of the new structure.

Second, the command and decisionmaking power in war production must be centralized and united. The fundamental and special feature of war production is that the balancing of supply, production and distribution and the quantity, quality, and date of delivery of the arms must be strictly in accordance with demands. In the event of errors and mishaps, minor ones may endanger personnel's lives while the serious ones may affect the security of the state. Hence, under the new structure, the command and decisionmaking power with regard to war production must correspondingly be centralized and united and should not be too scattered

among the defense industry's enterprises. In wartime, since civilian industry must directly or indirectly be shifted to serve the defense industry, which implies the enlargement of the scale of the defense industry, command and decision-making power are directed at the industry of the country as a whole and ipso facto become the overall command and the final decisionmaking power.

Third, management must be effective. From the standpoint of structure, this mainly refers to attaining the best coordination between the scope and administrative level of management. Generally speaking, the wider the management scope, the more the management levels and the lower the management effects. Hence, it is necessary, by means of reducing the direct management units (or persons), to reduce or tighten the management scope, thereby to reduce the management levels and ultimately achieve the objective of improving management effects. At the same time, this can create advantageous conditions for ensuring the centralization and unification of command and decisionmaking power in war production.

4) Under the conditions of a clear-cut demarcation between backbone and non-backbone defense industry enterprises, all defense industry enterprises must be separated from a direct subordinate relationship with the defense industry department. According to the two combinations guidelines, on the one hand, the demarcation between backbone and non-backbone defense industry enterprises is for the purposes of relatively centralizing and further stabilizing the crack forces in scientific research on defense industry production and also definitely specifying that the backbone defense industry enterprises should principally shoulder the tasks for the research and production of weapons and equipment for the armed forces in peacetime. As for the non-backbone defense industry enterprises (namely, the mobilized defense industry enterprises), they can, under the prerequisite that they coordinate with the backbone defense industry enterprises in fulfilling arms provision tasks, have a free hand in developing the production of civilian commodities, thus contributing to national construction. On the other hand, defense industry enterprises, like civilian industry enterprises, shall all be extricated from their direct subordinate relationship to the original principal government departments, thus enabling them relatively speaking to become independent commodity producers capable of going into competition on an equal basis with others. In accordance with the two combinations guidelines, regarding the backbone and non-backbone enterprises, separate and different administrative management should be enforced. The basic idea is that the backbone defense industry enterprises are registered in the central government's industrial and commercial administrative management departments and their administrative heads are appointed or dismissed by the central government (these are so-called "preserved" backbones). Non-backbone defense industry enterprises are registered in the local governments' industrial and commercial administrative and management departments and their administrative heads are subject to appointment and dismissal by local governments. All their other administrative subordinate relationships are abolished. Thus, the defense industry department can concentrate its efforts on enforcing united control of the organs of the defense industry, making and arranging arms production plans, and organizing the supply of raw materials and the sales (including exports) of arms. In the same manner, civilian departments can also concentrate their energies on enforcing the unified control of organs of the civilian industry. The various categories of enterprises will no longer show any differences whether they are

closely related to each other or not, important or not, except that in management and control a slight importance should be attached to the backbone enterprises, because they are the state's bases in defense production.

On the basis of readjusting and constructing the structure of the defense industry, mobilized defense industry, and ordinary civilian industry, in terms of management structure we should further differentiate between backbone and non-backbone enterprises and rationalize the industrial organs and the industrial system. In peacetime, under the precondition of definitely maintaining backbone war production, we should let the whole industry develop in an all-round manner. In wartime, defense production should be the nucleus and mobilization carried out level by level. This will basically solve the problem of peacetime-wartime dislocation. Following the separation of government from enterprise functions, defense production departments should depart from past practices of managing both arms and civilian commodities and turn to specially taking charge of arms, leaving the civilian commodities to the untied management of the civilian industry departments. Thus, this will form an industry and trade management system in which responsibilities and power are clarified and demarcated. This, in turn, will solve the problem of the civilian-military confrontation. Following the all-round separation of government from enterprise functions, government departments will shift from simultaneous macroeconomic and microeconomic control to specific macroeconomic control and the organs can be greatly retrenched and streamlined. Enterprises can exercise their own microeconomic management powers and have a free hand in their autonomous operations. It should be said that in this lies the essence of the industrial structure with the two combinations that we have been hoping for.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

LANZHOU MR LEADER ON DEVELOPING YANAN SPIRIT

OW192343 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1431 GMT 17 Mar 87

[By reporter Qin Weidong]

[Excerpts] Xian, 17 March (XINHUA)--Recently, a number of communist party members doing outstanding work in inheriting and carrying forward the Yanan Spirit were commended in a circular issued by the Shanxi Military District. Li Xuanhua, political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region, invited some of them to a forum, at which he demanded that all PLA units in the military district inherit the fine Yanan tradition and carry forward the Yanan Spirit to further improve themselves.

The party committee of the Shaanxi Military District has paid great attention to inheriting and carrying forward the Yanan Spirit as an important part of the ideological and political work of its PLA units in the new period and, accordingly, has carried out constant education in this fine tradition. The purpose is to see that the Yanan Spirit is passed down from generation to generation and is further developed.

Li Xianhua, political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region, who was inspecting the work of the Shaanxi Military District, said at the forum: The glorious tradition and fine workstyle our party and army fostered during the Yanan period are our precious revolutionary heritage. At this time, when a positive education in upholding the four cardinal principles and opposing bourgeois liberalization is being fully developed in our PLA units, it is of great importance to stress the need to inherit and carry forward the Yanan Spirit. Under the present circumstances, he pointed out, all PLA units in the military district should make a real success of education in the Yanan Spirit by focusing on the need of foster high communist ideals, keep to the fundamental goal of serving the people wholeheartedly, implement the ideological line of seeking truth from facts, carry forward the glorious tradition of plain living and hard struggle, adhere to the principle of unity between army and government, between the army and the people, and between officers and men, seriously study Marxist-Leninist theory, and strive to remodel world outlook. He asked all PLA units in the military district to proceed from reality to energetically study and explore the best method for conducting education in the Yanan Spirit during the new period and broaden the scope and develop new forms of this education so that the Yanan Spirit will continue to be carried forward.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

SOLDIERS LEAVE SERVICE WITH CIVILIAN TRADE SKILLS

OW101208 Beijing XINHUA in English 0851 GMT 10 Feb 87

[Text] Beijing, 10 February (XINHUA)--Recent surveys show more than 70 percent of the demobilized soldiers in China leave the armed forces as masters of one or two trade skills which they can put to use in their civilian life.

The armed forces started 25,000 training courses last year, which helped train more than 650,000 soldiers. Some 430,000 came home with at least one skill.

The Chinese Government decided early last year to cut the number of troops by 1 million. So far, the number of soldiers has been reduced by 410,000 and more than 300,000 officers have quite active service.

To make the transition to civilian life easier, more than 6,000 training bases have been set up in the country. They are fully equipped with regular teachers and teaching materials, internship shops. They also grant academic certificates.

The army has also cooperated with schools and factories in developing and running the training courses. Technological personnel in civilian institutions and even some private businessmen have been invited to teach.

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CSO: 4000/074

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

BELJING MR SOLDIERS, CIVILIANS HELP IN AFFORESTATION

OW141200 Beijing XINHUA in English 0915 GMT 14 Mar 87

[Text] Beijing, 14 March (XINHUA)--Chinese soldiers and civilians alike are actively taking part in the country's afforestation projects.

"We will not be left behind," an officer in charge of the Logistics Department of the Beijing Military Area Command said, "and this year soldiers in our area command will plant over 1 million trees covering 1,340 hectares and 900,000 square meters of lawn around their barracks."

"We have always considered afforestation as one of the country's major tasks," the officer said, adding one regiment stationed in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region went to the distant great Xingan mountains in Heilongjiang Province to get saplings and covered its barracks with green.

"Because the region is sandy with little rainfall, soldiers stationed there had to save their daily water supplies to irrigate the young trees," the officer said, "but now, the barracks are shaded by beautiful trees, making the area a noted scenic spot."

Soldiers in Baoding, Hebei Province, signed a contract to green the local hills, and last year used airplanes to spread 85,000 kilograms of seeds on 11,100 hectares of hilly land, with 57 percent of the seeds sprouting, the officer said.

"In recent years, we are trying to plant more fruit trees," he said, adding a military unit in Suburban Beijing now owns 340 hectares of orchards.

According to the officer, the military area command now owns 84 orchards, each covering over 7 hectares, and 8 occupying 70 hectares each. "By 1990, we will be able to harvest 100,000 tons of fruit a year, which can help supply the market demand," he said.

"The participation of Chinese soldiers in afforestation projects dates back to war time," the officer said, "as in March 1940 when China was fighting against Japanese invasion, Marshall Zhu De, who later became one of the top leaders in New China, led his soldiers in the planting of thousands of trees in the Taihang mountains."

"There the local people have erected a statue of Marshall Zhu next to a poplar he planted to commemorate his contribution to the nation," the officer said.

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

CHENGDU MR DEACTIVATES UNAUTHORIZED UNITS

OW151150 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1136 GMT 14 Mar 87

[Text] Chengdu, 14 March (XINHUA)--In the first 3 months of this year, the Chengdu Military Region has deactivated 109 unauthorized units and temporary organizations, streamlining some 4,700 personnel.

According to surveys by a relevant department under the Chengdu Military Region, it became quite common among the offices and units under the military region to set up unauthorized units and temporary organizations in recent years. As a result, while the military region was carrying out the reduction-in-strength reorganization of the PLA, more and more unauthorized units and temporary organizations appeared.

In order to consolidate the achievements of the reduction-in-strength reorganization, leaders of the military region took action to check on the unauthorized units and temporary organizations. Carrying out constant ideological mobilization, the leaders urged all units to put overall interests above anything else, strictly abide by discipline, and observe rules set by higher authorities for the structure of the military region. The military region office took the lead to deactivate 13 unauthorized units and make proper arrangements for the streamlined personnel by either transferring them to other jobs or sending them to work at the grass-roots level.

The military region has specially worked out 10 rules to reiterate the legality of its authorized table of organization. No units or individuals are allowed to alter this structure or set up units outside the structure, so that units already streamlined in the reduction-in-strength reorganization will not reemerge.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

LANZHOU MR ENCOURAGES HEALTHY CRITICISM

OW230314 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0314 GMT 22 Mar 87

[By reporter Qin Weidong]

[Excerpts] Lanzhou, 22 March (XINHUA)--A leading comrade of the LAnzhou Military Region who went to subordinate troop units to conduct investigations and study on special subjects has helped the troops acquire a correct mental attitude and work style by tackling the problem of people reluctant to accept criticism.

In May 1986, Li Xuanhua, political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region, stayed at a certain regiment to help improve its work and gain fristhand experience in guiding overall work. After more than a month's investigation, he discovered that while the regiment's overall performance was good, some of its work had been done superficially. He sternly criticized the regiment on this point, and cancelled several on-the-spot meetings scheduled to be held at the regiment. This normal cirticism, however, produced a series of reactions. The regiment's principal leading cadres felt wronged, pointing out that their problems were not uncommon, and that their fault was they happened to be in the spotlight. The regiment's superiors felt humiliated, and everybody in the lower units was talking about the matter.

These reactions convinced Li Xuanhua that, while it was difficult for people in general to accept criticism, it was even harder for an advanced unit to do so. His analysis of the matter led to the conclusion that "reluctance to accept criticism" reflected unhealthy party style, which must be resolved by a multitude of measures. Last December, Li Xuanhua went to the regiment a second time. he had heart-to-heart talks with the principal leaders of the regiment's party comiittee on how to correctly carry out criticism.

On 11 March of this year, Li Xuanhua visited the regiment for the third time. He held a variety of forums to further look into the question of people reluctant to accept criticism. He pointed out that the bureaucratic work style of leaders and organs who reward those reporting achievements and penalize those reporting problems were also an important factor contributing to reluctance to accept criticism. For some time, people regarded normal criticism as an act of coming down on them with a big stick or putting labels on them, and leaders had not been forceful in correcting this attitude. He asked

party committees and leading organs at all levels in the Lanzhou Military Region to change their work style and lead the troops in profoundly carrying out positive education on upholding the four cardinal principles, overcoming the state of flabbiness, and improving party style. At the same time, he urged them to highly commend models daring to criticize, accept criticism, or report both achievements and problems, in order to create a healthy environment and atmosphere for criticism.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

PUBLIC SECURITY MINISTER ON SOCIAL ORDER CODE

OW290419 Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin 1130 GMT 26 Jan 87

[Text] We now begin the Legal System Program. Dear listeners, we have completed the series on common knowledge of the Economic Contract Law. Starting tomorrow, we shall begin a series of 110 common-knowledge topics on the Regulations Concerning Offenses Against Public Order. For this series, our reporter had an interview with Cormade Ruan Chongwu, minister of public security.

[Begin recording] [Announcer]: Minister Ruan, the Regulations Concerning Offenses Against Public Order are one of the key laws to be popularized among our citizens; we wonder if you would please tell us why the Regulations are closely connected with the masses of the people.

[Ruan] The Regulations are a basic law of China, governing administrative work to control public order. They are also one of the norms of behavior every citizen must observe when he is a party to social life. The regulations, which specify the various types of offense against public order, have a direct bearing on the personal interests of every citizen.

China must have a stable social enviornment in order to carry out its drive for socialist modernization. Likewise, every one of us needs to have a stable, harmonious, and orderly social environment in which to work, study, and live normally. This must be guaranteed by a set of laws concerning the maintenance of public order. The Regulations are one of such laws.

In China, the masses of people enjoy full democracy and freedom. The (?practice of) democracy and freedom must be within the confines of the constitution and law, and a prerequisite is that it must not encroach on the interests of the state and the collective, and the legal rights of other people. No freedom is permissible if it goes beyond the limit of the law. The Regulations clearly spell out what actions are permissible and what are not, what actions are protected and what are prohibited by law, and what punishment there is for violation of the Regulaitons. All provisions in the Regulations are designed to safeguard social tranquility and protect the interests of the people. In this sense, there is no true freedom without necessary restrictions. A citizen must understand and observe this law in order to play a part in maintaining social order and effectively protect his own legal rights as well.

One of the basic principles of the Regulations is combining education with punishment. Firstly, we must educate our citizens to consciously abide by the Regulations. When everyone does this, there will be no need for punishment. But, in actual life, there is always a handful of people who are not so conscious, and may do something violating the Regulations. Their actions may not be serious enough and need not be punished as a criminal case; nevertheless, since they may bring certain harm to the interests of the state, society, and other citizens, it is completely necessary, and in accord with the interests of the masses of people, to give them appropriate punishment in accordance with the Regulations, because the legal rights of other citizens should be protected, and social order and public security safeguarded.

[Announcer] Minister Ruan, our Legal System Program will begin a series of common knowledge topics on the Regulations; do you have anything to say about what you hope this series will do?

[Ruan] The Regulations are one of the laws to be popularized to enhance the people's legal knowledge. We should give wide publicity to it in every way we can. I want to thank the Central People's Broadcasting Station for your support and assistance. The series will be easily understood by the masses of the people for its explanation of the Regulations in simple terms, and for its systematic introduction of the nature, tasks, guiding principles, scope of application, and other basic contents of the Regulations, by using past cases to back up explanations. This will be useful to public security cadres, policemen, and the public in studying and understanding the regulations, enabling them to use this legal weapon to safeguard public security and social order, and protect the public, as well as personal, interests of our citizens. I wish this series success.

[Announcer] Thank you for your comments. [end recording]

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

CONSTRUCTION ACHIEVEMENTS OF PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE

OW211026 Beijing XINHUA in English 0914 GMT 21 Feb 87

[Text] Beijing, 21 February (XINHUA)--The Chinese people's armed police force is diversifying activities to help the country's socialist construction.

One division of the armed police has located 65 gold mines and excavated 50,000 ounces of gold in recent years.

"The division also uses nine ships equipped for underwater gold mining," an officer from the headquarters of the armed police told XINHUA, "and we've combed the whole country surveying and mining for gold."

"A communication division of the force built five important highways including the China-Pakistan and China-Nepal highways in 1986, which exceeded the projected construction plan," the officer said, adding the construction projects involved 400 tunnels and 44 bridges spanning cliffs.

Three other highways built by the armed police force are significant to national defense and border economic development. The 100-kilometer Hetian-Buya highway carries 800 tons of coal daily from the Buya coal mine to Hetian, an industrial center in western Xinjiang. "This highway has promoted economic development in the area and helped stabilize the resident's life," the officer said.

The armed police force has also contracted to build three hydraulic power stations in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Jiangxi and Hebei Provinces.

The Tianshengqiao power station in Guangxi is one of the largest projects built with foreign funds. Last year, first-phase construction was completed, which involved tunnels to direct water flow through mountains.

To build the Wan'an power station in Jiangxi Province, policemen had to pour 300,000 cubic meters of concrete under difficult conditions.

When completed, the three power stations will have a total generating capacity of 1.94 million kilowatts.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT IN CIVILIAN USE--Beijing, 2 February (XINHUA)--Some 800,000 pieces of second hand equipment belonging to China's Air Force have been put to civilian use in recent years. Although not suitable for military use, these, including oil tanks, tires, engines, oxygen masks, power systems and hydraulic tubes, can still be used in civilian industry and farming, an Air Force spokesman said here today. Two old aircraft engines are now used as ventilators at a coal mine in Fushun, Liaoning Province, and over 40,000 used tires have been fixed to the carts of peasants in the same region. The Air Force has also donated 235 obsolete airplanes to 140 cities for display at children's palaces and museums. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0843 GMT 2 Feb 87 OW] /12232

PLA COAL MINE IN TIBET--Beijing, 4 February (XINHUA)--The People's Liberation Army has completed the development of a coal mine 4,700 meters above sea level in Ngamring County in the Tibet Autonomous region. It is believed to be the highest coal mine in the world, the LIBERATION ARMY DAILY reported Tuesday. The mine, developed by the army unit stationed in Xigaze, has a reserve of 1 million tons of coal, the paper said. At present the coal is mainly transported to local army units in the highland areas for heating and cooking. The area has consumed a lot of timber as it was used for firewood before the discovery of the coal seam, it said. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 0233 GMT 4 Feb 87 OW] /12232

RESERVE PARATROOP TRAINING CENTER--Beijing, 4 February (XINHUA)--China's first reserve parachute troop training center has become operational in central China, military sources here said today. The center is designed to train reserve forces for national defense in keeping with the country's strategic policy, and the first group of 152 parachutists graduated last month. The center includes an airport, a parachute drop zone, a parachute training zone, a war games zone and lecture rooms. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1045 GMT 4 Feb 87 OW] /12232

MOUNTAIN AFFORESTATION--The Chinese Air Force has sown tree seeds over more than 100,000 hectares of mountainous areas in Guangdong, Hubei and Gansu Provinces so far this year. The air force plans to air-seed a total of 313,000 hectares this year. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1308 GMT 11 Mar 87] /12232

SHENYANG LEADERS COMMEND PERSONNEL--Shenyang, 23 March (XINHUA)--Recently the shenyang Military Region commended 103 advanced units and individuals. Thirteen were given honorable titles, 29 cited as pacesetters, and the rest given awards as encouragement. Leading comrades of the Shenyang Military Region, including Commander Liu Jingsong and Political Commissar Liu Zhenhua, presented silk banners and honorable citations to them. [By reporter Yang Mingqing and Huang Mingsong] [Excerpts] [Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0712 GMT 23 Mar 87 OW] /12232

JINAN MILITIA, RESERVES WORK CONFERENCE--The Shandong Militia and Reserves Work Experience Exchange Conference was held 26-28 February in Jinan. Attending were provincial CPC Committee Secretary Liang Buting, Deputy Secretaries Lu Maozeng and Jiang Chunyun, Standing Committee member Gao Changli [7559 2490 4409], Vice Governors Ma Changgui and Ma Zhongchen; Jinan MR Deputy Commander Gu Hui [0942 6540], Deputy Political Commissar Song Qingwei [1345 3237 3262]; Shandong MD Commander Liu Yude and Political Commissar Cao Pengsheng. This was the first large scale conference held since the militia and reserves were transferred to the locales. [Excerpts] [Jinan DAZHONG RIBAO in Chinese 1 Mar 87 p 1]

ZHEJIANG ARMED FORCES CONFERENCE--A Zhejiang provincial party-managed armed forces work conference was held in Hangzhou on 25 December. The conference called for further strengthening party leadership of armed forces work. Zhejiang Governor and Armed Forces Committee Chairman Xue Ju and Zhejiang Military District Deputy Commander Yang Shijie spoke. Also in attendance were party, government, and military leading comrades Wu Minda, Ge Hongsheng, Wang Wenhui, Wu Hongge, Yan Baofu, and Yao Chao. [Excerpts] [Hangzhou ZHEJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 26 Dec 86 p 1]

WEAPONS TESTING VESSEL--Last year China's shipbuilding industry built the first large-scale marine weapons testing ship for the Navy--a target tender vessel--which creates conditions for the Navy to carry out open sea weapons testing. This ship was built by the Shanghai Shipbuilding Factory and has a displacement of 4,500 tons. Its areas of operation are unlimited and it can also be used for all types of open sea expeditions. (Based on XINHUA Beijing 20 January) [Excerpt] [Beijing RENMIN RIBAO (OVERSEAS EDITION) in Chinese 21 Jan 87 p 4]

CHIFENG GARRISON HELPS CIVILIANS--The PLA's Chifeng Garrison District has employed many methods to spur local economic development. A garrison regiment stationed in Mutougou helped the inhabitants quadruple their income since 1984. A division stationed in Linxi Xian mobilized personnel on 7,600 occasions and assisted in planting trees, moving more than 58,700 cubic meters of earth. [Excerpts] [Hohhot NEIMENGGU RIBAO in Chinese 24 Jan 87 p 1]

ARTILLERY INNOVATIONS CITED--Ge Feiyue [5514 7378 6460] is a technician in 3d Company of a certain Jinan MR antiartillery brigade. In his three years as a soldier, he implemented 7 technological reforms. Since 1980 he has completed 14 innovations, including the "HBK-84 automatic percussion mechanism" and "Type-59 100mm antiaircraft artillery Model CCS automatic retractable shell loading platform." Of these, 11 received army-wide awards for technical results, and 2 have been promoted throughout the army. [Excerpt] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN SHENGHUO in Chinese No 1, 13 Jan 87 p 20]

DEMOBILIZED CADRES IN SICHUAN--In 1986 Sichuan Province received almost 15,000 cadres who were transferred to the civilian sector, of whom 95 percent have already gone to work with their local organizations. [Excerpt] [Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 24 Jan 87 p 1]

FLYING BOAT DESIGNATIONS--The PS-5 [SH-5] flying boat was completely developed by China and can be used in anti-submarine, surface attack, marine patrol and reconnaissance, marine rescue, and marine transport roles. With slight modifications it can also be used to fight forest and urban fires. "PS" designates a patrol/anti-submarine aircraft; "SH" is used for the marine bomber version. [Excerpts] [Beijing HANGKONG ZHISHI in Chinese 6 Feb 87 p 2]

ZHI-6 HELICOPTER DESCRIBED--The Zhi-6 was designed and produced by the Harbin Aircraft Company based on their experience with the Zhi-5. It is China's first medium-lift single prop jet transport helicopter. Aside from the turboshaft power plant placed on top of the fuselage and the redesigned nose which improves the pilot's field of view, the propeller, landing gear, tail support, and engine compartment all make use of Zhi-5 design, so that the two craft are externally similar. However, the Zhi-6's external layout and cabin comfort are improved. After being test flown in 1968, it was entered into trial production and scientific testing. It weighs 4,820 kilograms, has a maximum takeoff weight of 7,600 kilograms, can carry 12 passengers or 1,200 kilos of goods, has a turboshaft engine with an output of 1,618 kilowatts, can fly 4 hours when empty, and has a maximum speed of 180 kph at 1,000 meters. [Text] [Beijing HANGKONG ZHISHI in Chinese 6 Feb 87 p 3]

HARBIN MSD CHANGES CRYPTO SYSTEM--In wireless telegram-telephone fendui training, the Harbin Military Subdistrict has changed its former Chinese character crypto codes to "pinyin" romanization crypto keys. Training time was reduced by three-fifths and transmission accuracy improved 20 percent. [Excerpt] [Beijing ZHONGGUO MINBING in Chinese No 2, 9 Feb 87 p 17]

RESERVE REGIMENT TRAINS WITH REGULARS--During refresher training, the Fuxin mining region reserve infantry regiment sent personnel to the field armies to ask advice, borrow instruction materials, and concentrate efforts in cultivating backbone cadres. Companies were sent to the units' barracks for training and to work with the units. [Text] [Shenyang DONGBEI MINBING in Chinese No 12, 4 Dec 86 p 17]

PLA COMMAND SYSTEM AUTOMATION--The PLA has applied computer technology to automating its command system. In recent years, it has developed more than 4,000 sets of applied software and hardware, which are playing an increasingly important in commanding army, military, political, and logistic work. [Summary] [Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin 1600 GMT 26 Dec 86 OW] /12232

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